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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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elationship with other equipment <strong>in</strong> networked environments. Attackers could<br />

potentially leverage the lower-assurance items to attack the higher-assurance items by<br />

hostilely chang<strong>in</strong>g the environment <strong>in</strong> which the higher-assurance items operate. The<br />

goal of the network security assurance process, which adds security controls with<strong>in</strong> a<br />

Biba Integrity Model-based architecture, is to address and mitigate these dangers.<br />

• Issues arise <strong>in</strong> regard to Section 23.1309 B 3:<br />

“Warn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system<br />

operat<strong>in</strong>g conditions and enable them to take appropriate corrective action.”<br />

It may be challeng<strong>in</strong>g to warn aga<strong>in</strong>st un<strong>in</strong>tended or nonanticipated <strong>in</strong>teractions result<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from other network-resident items that have no functional relationship to the system <strong>in</strong><br />

question. Also, the attack vectors of crackers (hostile human attackers) are difficult to<br />

predict because the attacks are constantly evolv<strong>in</strong>g. Given this, it is unlikely that many<br />

dangers may not be discerned until it is too late.<br />

• Issues arise <strong>in</strong> regard to Section 23.1309 B 4:<br />

“Compliance with the requirements of … may be shown by analysis and,<br />

where necessary, by appropriate ground, flight, or simulator tests.”<br />

Analysis is unlikely to address or recognize the gamut of possible subtle effects result<strong>in</strong>g<br />

from the postattack actions of a compromised network device. Similarly, preattack<br />

system <strong>in</strong>teractions that these types of tests would address may have little relationship to<br />

the modified system <strong>in</strong>teractions that occur dur<strong>in</strong>g or after attacks.<br />

• Issues arise <strong>in</strong> regard to Section 25.1309 b:<br />

“(b) The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately<br />

and <strong>in</strong> relation to other systems, must be designed so that – (1) the<br />

occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the cont<strong>in</strong>ued safe<br />

flight and land<strong>in</strong>g of the airplane is extremely improbable, …”<br />

This goal is difficult to achieve for networked software for fly-by-wire designs unless<br />

flight critical systems are partitioned by VPNs (or by an equivalently appropriate<br />

partition<strong>in</strong>g approach for networks) to limit and constra<strong>in</strong> un<strong>in</strong>tended <strong>in</strong>teractions that<br />

may occur dur<strong>in</strong>g or after the system has been attacked.<br />

• Issues arise <strong>in</strong> regard to Section 25.1309 d:<br />

“(d) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section must<br />

be shown by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate ground, flight, or<br />

simulator tests.”<br />

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