Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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While there are strong motivations (see section 1) arguing for the migration indicated in either figure 1 or figure 3 to take place, there are security and safety reasons for why the current airborne architecture should not change. Specifically, the existing system is safer and more secure than either of the target systems. Section 4 explains some of the reasons why the proposed changes that form the target designs result in significantly more risk to aircraft. A summary of these reasons include the following: • The larger the networked community of devices, the larger the potential number of threats to the entities within those networks due to (1) direct or indirect relationships between the networked entities themselves and (2) the increased possibility of hostile attackers being present within the system. • Due to the emergence of client-side attacks and other threats, the (human) end users of networked resources are now an important part of that network’s total security defense posture. Aircraft have limited control over the computer and network behavior of their Internet-connected passengers. NAS employees, as well as aircraft crew members, must be trained to ensure that their own computer behavior does not inadvertently enable attacks against the aircraft. This has direct security implications to both the airborne systems themselves as well as to those networks with which the aircraft connects. • Entities within networks that are directly or indirectly connected to the Internet may possibly be accessible by attackers located elsewhere in the Internet, despite the presence of intervening security firewalls. This implies that more than one billion people may (theoretically) potentially have access to aircraft. • The Internet has experienced many well-documented instances of hostile attacks affecting the integrity of computers, networked systems, and the data and services they support. • COTS computer systems have an indeterminate number of latent bugs that can be attacked. • COTS computer systems cannot be adequately secured within large network environments, in general, because their security controls cannot be trusted to perform as intended when attacked. They represent possible footholds that attackers can compromise and use as a base from which to attack other networked entities. • Security vulnerabilities, including those stemming from deploying COTS devices or systems, can theoretically be mitigated. However, the viability of those mitigation approaches are themselves suspect to the extent that they rely upon COTS systems for their implementation. This is because COTS software and systems—and the functionality they support—are not trustworthy when attacked. 12
• The security viability of current networked systems is partially a direct function of the network and system management (including configuration management) expertise of its administrative personnel. • The protocols of the IP family can be secured, but their cumulative underlying key management system is ad hoc and complex—with direct configuration and management implications. • The IP family’s network management system, including its underlying simple network management protocol version 3 (SNMPv3) protocol, has questionable security viability when used in network environments that have large numbers of devices built by many different vendors. • Whenever different security administrations or technologies are joined together in a cooperative manner (e.g., aircraft and ground systems), it is important and challenging to define the interfaces between the systems in such a way that a diminished security posture for the combined system as a whole does not result. This report describes assurance mechanisms to mitigate these threats. However, the mitigation system has one key missing element (see section 7.2). Until that element has been successfully addressed, no networked system can currently be guaranteed to be as safe or as secure as the currently deployed non-networked airborne systems. 2.2 WHY BOTH TARGET ALTERNATIVES HAVE SIMILAR SECURITY POSTURES. It was mentioned that the architecture in figure 3 is more secure than the architecture in figure 1. However, both alternatives have similar security postures, such that the same network solution, which is described in section 8.3, addresses the security and safety requirements for both target alternatives. Figure 4 shows that both target alternatives similarly expose onboard aircraft systems to possible attacks from the worldwide Internet infrastructure for the reasons explained in section 4.1. While the air gap between passenger and avionics equipment of figure 3 (see bottom of figure 4) protects avionics systems from being directly attacked intra-aircraft from the passenger network, they are still theoretically exposed to remote passenger or Internet attack via the NAS. 13
Page 1 and 2: DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
Page 3 and 4: 1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
Page 5 and 6: 5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
Page 7 and 8: 11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
Page 9 and 10: 22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
Page 11 and 12: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 13 and 14: PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
Page 15 and 16: This report states that the primary
Page 17 and 18: 1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
Page 19 and 20: protocol (IP)-based communications.
Page 21 and 22: of linking aircraft-resident system
Page 23 and 24: Industry and governments are extrem
Page 25 and 26: 2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
Page 27: Other Control Sites Controller ATC
Page 31 and 32: alternative requires that parallel
Page 33 and 34: Aircraft network security is a syst
Page 35 and 36: 4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
Page 37 and 38: General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
Page 39 and 40: esources so that the required real-
Page 41 and 42: “With the rise of client-side att
Page 43 and 44: • During an 11-month period (Apri
Page 45 and 46: attempt the theft of passwords. Non
Page 47 and 48: IP networks are organized in terms
Page 49 and 50: either the user or the trusted soft
Page 51 and 52: However, the previous paragraph beg
Page 53 and 54: Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
Page 59 and 60: • Lightweight directory access pr
Page 61 and 62: mechanism to overcome the key distr
Page 63 and 64: Deployments that need to support mu
Page 65 and 66: Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
Page 67 and 68: Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
Page 69 and 70: in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
Page 71 and 72: Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
Page 73 and 74: encrypted and then encapsulated wit
Page 75 and 76: Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
Page 77 and 78: via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
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• Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
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Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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using the traditional dual router i
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mechanism relies upon the controlle
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HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
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8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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(AJ) or low probability of intercep
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design decisions that need to be de
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9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
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9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
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alerted the pilots because the fail
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environments. If the certification
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DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
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elationship with other equipment in
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approach is to keep the log informa
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11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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environments should be extended to
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12. COTS computer systems cannot be
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14. NAS and airborne network archit
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22. If SWAP considerations permit,
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11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
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59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
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the following is a pointer to a rel
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Department of Defense Instruction N
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Information Assurance—The Departm
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Threat source—Either (1) intent a
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information found within these data
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(HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
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The simple network management proto
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opportunities to crack the hosting
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authorized to perform. 13 However,
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sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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