Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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0302, Proceedings of the 7 th USENIX Security Symposium, San Antonio, Texas, January 1998, pp. 63-78. http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/full_papers/cowan/ cowan.pdf 97. Bolduc, L., “Verifying Modern Processors in Integrated Modular Avionics Systems,” AlliedSignal Aerospace, Columbia, MD, 1999. http://www.chillarege.com/fastabstracts/issre99/99110.pdf 98. Jacklin, S., Lowry, M., Schumann, J., Gupta, P., Bosworth, J., Zavala, E., Kelly, J., Hayhurst, K., Belcastro, C., and Belcastro, C., “Verification, Validation, and Certification Challenges for Adaptive Flight-Critical Control System Software,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference and Exhibit, Providence, Rhode Island, August 16-19, 2004. 99. Rosen, E., De Clercq, J., Paridaens, O., T’Joens, Y., and Sargor, C., “Architecture for the Use of PE-PE IPsec Tunnels in BGP/MPLS IP VPNs,” August 2005. http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-l3vpn-ipsec-2547-05.txt 100. http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/l3vpn-charter.html (Note: this link will only be active for as long as the L3VPN working group will exist in the IETF. After the working group is eventually disbanded, this URL will no longer be valid.) 101. Templin, F., “IPvLX—IP With Virtual Link eXtension,” September 22, 2005. http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-templin-ipvlx-04.txt 102. APIM 04-012, “ARINC IA Project Initiation/Modification (APIM),” April 19, 2005. http://www.arinc.com/aeec/projects/fms/04_012_apim_fmc.pdf 103. Adams, C., “Test Cards for the Airbus A380.” http://www.aim-online.com/PressRelease/afdx.pdf 104. http://www.afdx.net/ http://west.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d85001p.pdf 13. RELATED DOCUMENTATION. Ibrahim, L., Jarzombek, J., Ashford, M., Bate, R., Croll, P., Horn, M., LaBruyere, L., and Wells, C., “Safety and Security Extensions for Integrated Capability Maturity Models,” September 2004, FAA, 141 pages. National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) No. 11, “National Policy Governing the Acquisition of Information Assurance (IA) and IA-Enabled Information Technology Products,” January 2000. 156
Department of Defense Instruction Number 5200.40, “DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP),” December 30, 1997. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Yang, Y., “Generic Threats to Routing Protocols,” RFC 4593, October 2006, 22 pages. http://www.ieff.org/rfc/rfc4593.txt DoD 8510.1-M, “Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) – Application Manual,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, July 31, 2000. Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1, October 17, 2004. http://akss.dau.mil/dag/ Little, A., “Study Into the Potential Impact of Changes in Technology on the Development of Air Transport in the UK,” Final Report to the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR), November 2000. 14. GLOSSARY. Accreditation—Accreditation is a formal declaration by a DAA that a software system or device is approved to operate in a particular safety and security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable level of risk. Assurance—Assurance is the measure of confidence that a system’s safety and security features have been implemented and work properly. Assurance properties must apply throughout a system’s life cycle and is achieved through design, testing, and analysis. Certification—The comprehensive evaluation of the technical and nontechnical safety and security features of a system and the other safeguards that are created in support of the accreditation process, to establish the extent that a particular design and implementation meets the set of specific safety and security requirements. Control—A feature or function of the IT system used to mitigate the likelihood of a vulnerability being exercised and to reduce the impact of such an adverse event. Crack—To electronically attack a computer or device by a successful exploit that compromises the machine and enables the attacker to take control over the machine, download Trojan Horses, and establish back doors so that the attacker could re-establish control over the machine at any subsequent time. Daemon—A daemon is a background process that performs a specific function or system-related task (e.g., print). In Unix or Linux systems, daemons are programs rather than parts of the operating system’s kernel. In other operating systems, they may be a constituent part of the operating system itself. Many daemons start at the operating system’s boot time and continue to 157
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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software has been confirmed as leve
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• Both safety and security are co
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Device at Safety level X Device at
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in a Biba Integrity Model environme
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Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
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(see section 9.10). A secure mechan
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employed in security-critical appli
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concept, which is needed to create
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4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
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exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
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Page 127 and 128: using the traditional dual router i
Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132: HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
Page 135 and 136: (AJ) or low probability of intercep
Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 143 and 144: alerted the pilots because the fail
Page 145 and 146: environments. If the certification
Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150: elationship with other equipment in
Page 151 and 152: approach is to keep the log informa
Page 153 and 154: 11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
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Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
Page 159 and 160: 14. NAS and airborne network archit
Page 161 and 162: 22. If SWAP considerations permit,
Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
Page 167 and 168: 32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
Page 169 and 170: 59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
Page 181 and 182: (HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
Page 183 and 184: The simple network management proto
Page 185 and 186: opportunities to crack the hosting
Page 187 and 188: authorized to perform. 13 However,
Page 189 and 190: sniffers, log-cleaning scripts, and
Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
Page 193 and 194: • Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
Page 195 and 196: affected by the signal intermittenc
Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 203 and 204: should be emphasized that there is
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