Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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10.7 HOW CAN SECURITY BREACHES BE HANDLED? The security control life cycle (see section 5.1), which is associated with the IATF defense-indepth concepts, addresses this issue, stating that it contains four different types of control elements: • Protection—This study has focused on this part of defense, which is most clearly seen within the exemplar network airborne architecture. • Detection—The architecture needs to include mechanisms (e.g., sensors) to discern that successful attacks have occurred. This report has only mentioned two such mechanisms, the deployment of Tripwire-like software integrity system and the systematic use of log files. Although not mentioned in this study, a variety of other detection mechanisms should be enabled within a real-life deployment: - The firewall, packet filter, and VPN gateways could be configured to provide alerts for certain types of identified behaviors. - The deployment would directly benefit from having a NIDS closely associated with the firewall if SWAP issues are not a problem. - The deployment should have well-thought-out network management capabilities, including the ability to fuse together health reports (e.g., alerts) from many different systems to form a common operational picture. • Reaction/neutralization—This refers to automated policies that have been created to respond to certain types of events. For example, if a NIDS is deployed, then the NIDS could be potentially configured to provide an automated reaction to certain types of attack signatures. However, in many airborne systems, the reaction capabilities may be limited to providing alerts to the crew (potentially with real-time copies to ground-based administrative entities) that specifically identified problems have been observed. These administrators could then take appropriate steps to address those problems. • Recovery/reconstitution—The possibility exists that the attacks were so successful that the system as a whole (or specific elements of the whole) is of doubtful integrity. Administrators or crew could theoretically download from the secure ground-based software site preattack versions of all software that they suspect were compromised due to reports from the Tripwire-like software integrity checker or other sources. Regardless, a constituent part of any security architecture is to design safe, efficient, and secure mechanisms to completely reconstitute the entire system in an effective manner when needed so that the entire system could return to a known preattack state. It is probable that this complete reconstitution capability should only be permitted to occur when the aircraft is on the ground. 136
11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircraft certification safety assurance processes for airborne systems and equipment are based on ARP 4754, ARP 4761, and various certification authority advisory material (e.g., AC 25.1309-1A) and aircraft manufacturer standards. Civil airborne system software assurance is based on DO-178B, which defines a structured, rigorous development and verification processes for assurance of the embedded software, and other various certification authority and industry policies and standards. ARP 4754 provides guidance for the system development processes to address the safety issues that arise from highly integrated or complex airborne system relationships. It provides guidance for conducting system safety assessments, and references ARP 4761, which defines methods and approaches for conducting safety analysis techniques, such as functional hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis. Approving networked airborne systems should be recognized as being a significant extension to ARP 4754. Networked systems differ from the current ARP 4754 environment in several significant ways. Networked elements are systems that include all of the networks and their constituent elements and users to which the network is directly or indirectly attached. Networks are, therefore, arbitrarily huge, and the many interrelationships of the system items are often too subtle to discern. Networks are inherently complex systems in which every item in the network is inadvertently integrated, regardless of whether those items share any common functional goal. Approval of networked entities must now also address possible network interactions that occur during, and result from, network attacks. The various networked elements potentially have a fate-sharing relationship with each other because any compromised network entity can theoretically be used to attack other networked items or their shared network environment. Embedding airborne software within network systems represents an extension of the ARP 4754 environment to networked items that share limited common functional relationships with each other. This is because entities or components of a system are connected into a common network environment regardless of the original functional intent of the system design (e.g., multiple aircraft domains can be connected by a common network system). Networks are inherently hostile environments because every network user, which includes both devices (and their software) and humans, are potential threats to that environment. Networked environments and the entities that comprise them need to be protected from three specific classes of threat agents: (1) the corrupted or careless insider, (2) the hostile outsider, and (3) client-side attacks. Because of these dangers, ARP 4754 needs to be extended for networked environments by ensuring network security protection and function/component availability and integrity. This, in turn, implies the need to strategically deploy IA security controls within network airborne systems. Safety and security have, therefore, become intertwined concepts within networked airborne environments. Security engineering addresses the potential for failure of security controls caused by malicious actions or other means. Safety analysis focuses on the effects of failure modes. The two concepts (safety and security) are, therefore, directly related through failure effects. A shortcoming of either a safety process or a security process may cause a failure in a 137
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
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6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
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6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
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their own classification level nor
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integrity is not permitted to obser
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Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
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Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
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Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141 and 142: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 143 and 144: alerted the pilots because the fail
Page 145 and 146: environments. If the certification
Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150: elationship with other equipment in
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Page 155 and 156: environments should be extended to
Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
Page 159 and 160: 14. NAS and airborne network archit
Page 161 and 162: 22. If SWAP considerations permit,
Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
Page 167 and 168: 32. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S., Muck
Page 169 and 170: 59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
Page 181 and 182: (HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
Page 183 and 184: The simple network management proto
Page 185 and 186: opportunities to crack the hosting
Page 187 and 188: authorized to perform. 13 However,
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
Page 193 and 194: • Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
Page 195 and 196: affected by the signal intermittenc
Page 197 and 198: A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
Page 199 and 200: Survey Question What is the primary
Page 201 and 202: Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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