Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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• Class 3 hardware is either a display mounted permanently to one side of the pilot or incorporated in a multifunction display on the forward panel. In other words, it is an installed piece of avionics that is part of an amended type certificate and, therefore, must satisfy all applicable regulations and policy. Three types of EFB software applications are also identified. • Type A software applications allow for report documents to be displayed. No certification is required to duplicate a report in electronic form. However, the FAA flight standards should evaluate and accept the applications for operational use in commercial carrier use, especially if intended to replace the report documents. • Type B software applications have a higher operational approval level and are more capable and should also be evaluated by the FAA flight standards for operational use. • Type C software applications have to meet FAA DO-178B assurance and policy and must be approved as part of the certified system. Type C applications also allow the aircraft’s own-ship position to be depicted on the ground and in the air for situational awareness purposes (but not for use in navigation). AC 120-76A specifies how the intersection of specific types of EFB hardware and specific types EFB software need to be designed and operated to achieve acceptable safety assurance. EFBs fulfill many valuable aircraft functions. For example, • EFBs often provide required flight performance data, including weight and balance, route and weather conditions, air traffic control inputs, and updated flight manuals. • updating report documents proved to be a nuisance, with some aircraft needing updates several times a year. When that happens, that aircraft type fleet-wide would have to be upgraded, a very manually intensive process. • MD-11 aircraft in the late 1990s were equipped with a central fault display information unit (CFDIU), a system that electronically queries various aircraft systems for faults and reports nonspecific information to pilots, in addition to storing diagnostic information that mechanics retrieve after landing. To make better use of the monitoring capability, however, FedEx developed and installed an onboard maintenance terminal (OMT), a rugged laptop computer with a small touch screen, which currently would be called a Class III EFB given its rigorous certification and integration with aircraft subsystems. Installed in the flight engineer’s station, the OMT would query the CFDIU for information about faults and then radio the results to the ground through the Aircraft Communications and Reporting System (ACARS) so that maintenance teams could prepare for an aircraft’s maintenance needs at the next stop. The EFB converted what had been a reactive system into a proactive one. If a redundant heating element in a pitot tube had burned out during a flight, for example, the MD-11 CFDIU would not have 126
alerted the pilots because the failure was not a flight-critical item, leaving mechanics to find the discrepancy when downloading the CFDIU at a maintenance stop. With the OMT, however, ground crews now would be alerted via ACARS and would be ready to fix the problem at the next stop rather than having to find out about the problem later. Some military airplanes are designed so that classified mission critical functionality (not flight) resides on laptop computers. The configuration of these laptop computers must be maintained to guarantee that they cannot corrupt other computer systems on the airplane network. This report presumes that EFB functionality must similarly be protected from unauthorized modification that could compromise the integrity of the data or affect other networked systems. The latter includes explicit protection against the introduction of viruses, worms, or other types of malware. Like military laptop computers, the EFB must be controlled through policies and procedures commensurate to its level of security (safety). This architecture requires that EFB devices must be certified and deployed in conformance with the architecture just like any other networked nonpassenger device within the aircraft. Because these devices are COTS computers, this report states that they cannot themselves be certified at any higher-assurance level. Specifically, the viability of their security controls directly relies upon the vicissitudes of administrative configuration and management oversight and they are directly vulnerable to the problems discussed in sections 4.1 through 4.4. For this reason, any coupling of EFB devices within higher-assurance environments must occur via HAGs. Since HAGs are tailored for specific deployment environments, this requirement implies that EFP functionalities be directly coordinated with specific HAG devices in an FAA-supervised manner. 9.5 UPDATING SECURITY PROTECTION SOFTWARE. Higher-assurance devices need to be designed so that they cannot be mismanaged or misconfigured. By contrast, the security controls of lower-assurance devices have dependencies upon the vicissitudes of administrative configuration and management oversight. They are also often directly vulnerable to the problems discussed in sections 4.1 through 4.4. Nevertheless, their security protection software and update policies and procedures should be assessed as part of the certification process. That process should directly assess all networked devices in terms of documented network threats. However, the process also needs to evaluate lower-assurance devices in terms of their participation within a standard airborne defense-in-depth security architecture. That security architecture must conform to IATF-recommended and COTS supported protection mechanisms. These lower-assurance devices must be configured and managed so that they support the aircraft’s defense-in-depth security design and the certification process should ensure that this is possible. The IA security design shall also address life cycle control issues (see section 5.1). The criticality of assured software update procedures and their potential safety impact must be considered and acceptable procedures developed. Updates to antivirus software signature files occur regularly and do not change the executable software on the computer; therefore, the safety impact of this type of update may be considered low as long as the integrity of the software 127
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
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6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
Page 127 and 128: using the traditional dual router i
Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132: HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
Page 135 and 136: (AJ) or low probability of intercep
Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
Page 139 and 140: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 141: 9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and
Page 145 and 146: environments. If the certification
Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150: elationship with other equipment in
Page 151 and 152: approach is to keep the log informa
Page 153 and 154: 11. SUMMARY. Current civilian aircr
Page 155 and 156: environments should be extended to
Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
Page 159 and 160: 14. NAS and airborne network archit
Page 161 and 162: 22. If SWAP considerations permit,
Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
Page 165 and 166: 9. Lee, Y., Rachlin, E., and Scandu
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Page 169 and 170: 59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
Page 181 and 182: (HTTP) traffic (port 80), port scan
Page 183 and 184: The simple network management proto
Page 185 and 186: opportunities to crack the hosting
Page 187 and 188: authorized to perform. 13 However,
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Page 191 and 192: A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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