Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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Level B Encapsulation Gateway Level A HAG Level D HAG Encapsulation Gateway Dedicated LAN providing enhanced QoS guarantees (e.g., minimized latencies) Encapsulation Gateway Figure 36. Notional IMA Design (Example 1) The devices in the figure with an X are IMA devices. It is possible that the normal airplane VPN design shown will provide adequate support for IMA’s real-time requirements. However, figure 36 assumes a worst-case scenario where this is not the case. Therefore, figure 36 provides an architecture where very tight real-time requirements for IMA interactions can be supported. Figure 37 shows the same IMA devices that were in figure 36 except they are now deployed within a system-high environment (i.e., Requirement 6). There needs to be a special process or policy established within a system-high enclave to enable a system-high situation to exist, since it represents an exception to the direct application of the Biba Integrity Model, which naturally results in MSLS networks (i.e., see Requirement 1 of section 8.2). “System High” at Level D Level A Level D Level B Level B Level B Figure 37. Notional IMA Design (Example 2) 124
9.3 USING PUBLIC IPs. The model and architecture presented in this study does not rely upon any unique IP addressing posture. The only IP requirements of the model are that • the nonenclaved devices within the airplane (e.g., the airplane’s firewall, ASBR, etc.) need to be IP addressable by other airplane and NAS ground entities. The architecture simply does not care whether this is achieved by using public IP addresses, whether the entire aeronautical network uses the same common private address space, 35 or whether a combination of private IP addresses and an airplane-local NAT is used. • the entities within each VPN enclave must be addressed from the same IP address space. The architecture does not care whether this IP address space is public or private. The IETF community has had extensive internal discussions about whether private IP addresses are more secure than public IP addresses. While this remains a highly controversial topic, the majority’s position is that private addresses have no appreciable security benefit over public IP addresses. The most powerful argument in favor of using private IP addresses for security purposes is that because private addresses have no uniqueness property outside of their enclave, use of private addresses cloaks internal networks from external visibility and limits access. The force of this argument diminishes the more closely one examines the details for maintaining private addresses within public spheres. 9.4 ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS. AC 120-76A [8] provides guidance for the certification, airworthiness, and operational approval of electronic flight bag (EFB) computing devices. EFB equipment refers to the replacement of historically report-based aviation data and calculations by onboard computing equipment (e.g., auxiliary performance computers or laptop auxiliary performance computers) to assist aircraft operations. EFBs may also host new types of database information and applications. Three distinct classes of EFB hardware devices are defined according to their relative integration with onboard resources such as electric power, data connectivity, and mounting. • Class 1 hardware are portable COTS laptop or pen tablet computers with software applications that can include electronic documents, performance calculations and charts. Class 1 do not require certification, but they must be stowed for takeoff and landing. These devices are mostly employed in training and flight planning and for use with reference manuals and in performance calculations. • Class 2 hardware are semipermanent in that they can dock with a certified crashworthy mount, can be powered all of the time and can tap into noncritical aircraft systems, allowing for cabin video displays and aircraft health monitoring and reporting, or links to an onboard file server. 35 If the NAS does not use public IP addresses, then this alternative would mean that a NAT would be needed to provide airplane connectivity to non-NAS IP networks such as the Internet. 125
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DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 Air Traffic Organi
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1. Report No. DOT/FAA/AR-08/31 4. T
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5.4.2 Aircraft as a Node (MIP and M
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11.1 Findings and Recommendations 1
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22 Customer’s L3VPN Protocol Stac
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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PBN PC PE PEP PFS PIB PIM-DM PIM-SM
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This report states that the primary
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1. INTRODUCTION. This is the final
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protocol (IP)-based communications.
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of linking aircraft-resident system
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Industry and governments are extrem
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2.1 NOTIONAL NETWORKED AIRCRAFT ARC
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Other Control Sites Controller ATC
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• The security viability of curre
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alternative requires that parallel
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Aircraft network security is a syst
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4. NETWORK RISKS. This section spec
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General Threat Identifiers FAILURE
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esources so that the required real-
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“With the rise of client-side att
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• During an 11-month period (Apri
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attempt the theft of passwords. Non
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IP networks are organized in terms
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either the user or the trusted soft
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However, the previous paragraph beg
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Table 1. Internet Engineering Task
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• Lightweight directory access pr
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mechanism to overcome the key distr
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Deployments that need to support mu
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Today’s Reality: Islands of Commu
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Simultaneously, IP addresses are al
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in-depth manner. Defense-in-depth m
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Protection Detection Reaction / Neu
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encrypted and then encapsulated wit
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Internet (grouping of autonomous sy
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via that same IP address. Specifica
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deployments. Regional flights that
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neighbor as a next hop after “Hol
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Interface Interface Customer Site S
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Interface Customer’s Application
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Although the vast majority of PBN s
Page 89 and 90: 6. RELATING SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR
Page 91 and 92: 6.1.1 Integrity. As section 4.3 ind
Page 93 and 94: As mentioned in section 4.4, the hi
Page 95 and 96: 6.1.4 Confidentiality. Confidential
Page 97 and 98: their own classification level nor
Page 99 and 100: integrity is not permitted to obser
Page 101 and 102: software has been confirmed as leve
Page 103 and 104: • Both safety and security are co
Page 105 and 106: Device at Safety level X Device at
Page 107 and 108: in a Biba Integrity Model environme
Page 109 and 110: Common Criteria Classes ACM—Confi
Page 111 and 112: (see section 9.10). A secure mechan
Page 113 and 114: employed in security-critical appli
Page 115 and 116: concept, which is needed to create
Page 117 and 118: 4. Learn from past mistakes. Poor d
Page 119 and 120: exemplar airborne network architect
Page 121 and 122: • Requirement 8: Biba Integrity M
Page 123 and 124: Figure 31 shows how the recommended
Page 125 and 126: to-live (TTL) field in the IP heade
Page 127 and 128: using the traditional dual router i
Page 129 and 130: mechanism relies upon the controlle
Page 131 and 132: HAGs are high-assurance devices tha
Page 133 and 134: 8.3.5 Firewall. The firewall needs
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Page 137 and 138: design decisions that need to be de
Page 139: 9.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS IMP
Page 143 and 144: alerted the pilots because the fail
Page 145 and 146: environments. If the certification
Page 147 and 148: DSS (FIPS 186 [81]). Code signing i
Page 149 and 150: elationship with other equipment in
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Page 157 and 158: 12. COTS computer systems cannot be
Page 159 and 160: 14. NAS and airborne network archit
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Page 163 and 164: 11.2 TOPICS NEEDING FURTHER STUDY.
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Page 169 and 170: 59. Raisinghani, V. and Sridhar, I.
Page 171 and 172: the following is a pointer to a rel
Page 173 and 174: Department of Defense Instruction N
Page 175 and 176: Information Assurance—The Departm
Page 177 and 178: Threat source—Either (1) intent a
Page 179 and 180: information found within these data
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A.3.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS. Th
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• Disclosure: Disclosure of routi
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affected by the signal intermittenc
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A-15. Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y
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Survey Question What is the primary
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Survey Question What is the primary
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should be emphasized that there is
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Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA

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