Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA
Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA
Local Area Networks (LANs) in Aircraft - FTP Directory Listing - FAA
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Survey Question<br />
What is the primary role of your<br />
employer <strong>in</strong> regards to commercial<br />
aviation?<br />
Build<br />
Components<br />
Build<br />
<strong>Aircraft</strong><br />
Survey Responses<br />
U.S.<br />
Federal<br />
Agency<br />
Consultant<br />
Number of respondents <strong>in</strong> each category: 7 3 5 5 2<br />
24E. In your personal op<strong>in</strong>ion, could the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g security failures dur<strong>in</strong>g flight<br />
potentially result <strong>in</strong> major (or greater)<br />
safety failures to that aircraft: The<br />
contents of the data travers<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
aircraft’s LAN become known to a<br />
remote electronic attacker?<br />
5 – Yes<br />
2 – No<br />
1 –Yes<br />
2 – No<br />
2 – Yes<br />
1 – No<br />
2 - NA<br />
1 – Yes<br />
4 – No<br />
2- No<br />
24F. In your personal op<strong>in</strong>ion, could the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g security failures dur<strong>in</strong>g flight<br />
potentially result <strong>in</strong> major (or greater)<br />
safety failures to that aircraft: The<br />
identities of passengers and crew onboard<br />
the aircraft become known to<br />
unauthorized hostile entities?<br />
24G. In your personal op<strong>in</strong>ion, could the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g security failures dur<strong>in</strong>g flight<br />
potentially result <strong>in</strong> major (or greater)<br />
safety failures to that aircraft: The<br />
current location of the aircraft is<br />
accurately tracked <strong>in</strong> real time by<br />
unauthorized hostile entities?<br />
24H. In your personal op<strong>in</strong>ion could the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g security failures dur<strong>in</strong>g flight<br />
potentially result <strong>in</strong> major (or greater)<br />
safety failures to that aircraft: The<br />
authentication <strong>in</strong>frastructure (e.g., Public<br />
Key Infrastructure) used by the NAS<br />
becomes maliciously compromised so<br />
that it is no longer trustworthy?<br />
25. Have you designed or deployed, or<br />
do you currently plan to design or deploy,<br />
<strong>LANs</strong> onboard aircraft?<br />
26. Who handles LAN-related security<br />
breaches onboard aircraft dur<strong>in</strong>g flight?<br />
27. Will the onboard LAN potentially<br />
provide connectivity of avionics<br />
equipment to the NAS?<br />
28. Will the onboard LAN potentially<br />
enable connectivity of avionics<br />
equipment to the worldwide Internet<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure?<br />
3 – Yes<br />
4 – No<br />
4 – Yes<br />
3 – No<br />
2 – Yes<br />
4 – No<br />
1 – I don’t<br />
know<br />
1 – Yes<br />
6 – No<br />
1 –<br />
<strong>in</strong>telligent<br />
systems and<br />
groundbased<br />
personnel<br />
6 – NA<br />
1 – Yes<br />
6 – NA<br />
1 – No<br />
6 - NA<br />
1 –Yes<br />
2 – No<br />
2 –Yes<br />
1 – No<br />
2 –Yes<br />
1 – No<br />
1 –Yes<br />
2 – No<br />
1 –<br />
<strong>in</strong>telligent<br />
systems<br />
2– NA<br />
1 –Yes<br />
2 - NA<br />
1 –Yes<br />
2 - NA<br />
2 – Yes<br />
2 – No<br />
1 - NA<br />
2 – Yes<br />
2 – No<br />
1 - NA<br />
1 – No<br />
4 – NA<br />
1 – Yes<br />
3 – No<br />
1 – NA<br />
1 –<br />
groundbased<br />
personnel<br />
4 – NA<br />
1 – No<br />
4 – NA<br />
1 – No<br />
4 – NA<br />
1 – Yes<br />
4 – No<br />
1 – Yes<br />
4 – No<br />
1 – Yes<br />
4 – No<br />
2 – Yes<br />
3 – No<br />
1 – <strong>in</strong>telligent<br />
systems<br />
1 – groundbased<br />
personnel<br />
3 – NA<br />
2 – No<br />
3 - NA<br />
1 – Yes<br />
1 – No<br />
3 – NA<br />
Other<br />
2 - Yes<br />
2 - Yes<br />
1 – Yes<br />
1 - No<br />
1 – Yes<br />
1 - No<br />
2 - NA<br />
1 – No<br />
1 - NA<br />
1 – No<br />
1 - NA<br />
B-4