14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence

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100 substantially higher predictive power 3, 41 . In the United States, distrust in repository management was mainly linked to opposition to the proposed siting of the Yucca mountain radioactive waste repository, because of the perceived risk of the waste site 42 . Other studies show that trust is significant across a range of hazards and risks 43 , although the precise underlying reasons for trust and distrust may vary in different risk cases and contexts. In the case of GM crops, for example, it was the ambiguity of risks (see Chapter 4) alongside concern about the activities of large multinational corporations imposing risks on people without their consent; for foot and mouth disease, it was the insensitivity to local impacts of the central management strategies. In conceptual terms, trust cuts across all of the main approaches to risk perceptions described above, while a number of recent risk controversies — including BSE and GM crops — have made policymakers aware that the public have become key players in many controversial risk issues, and that (dis)trust may be a core component of this 39, 44 . Trust is often conceptualized as a set of cognitive judgements along discrete dimensions that are primarily related to the (presumed) behaviour of risk managers, particularly around their care, competence and vested interest 43, 45 . We trust people, experts and institutions if they act in a caring way towards us, are knowledgeable about the domain at hand, and are demonstrably free from any self-serving interest or partisan bias (and ideally those who simultaneously exhibit all three!). These three dimensions help to explain why ‘independent scientists’ remain some of the most trusted social actors in relation to communicating about controversial risk issues. Other more recent work suggests that social trust and cooperation can also be built on the identity-based concepts of value similarity. That is, we tend to trust people who share our values or are members of our own social group, especially when information about a risk is either uncertain or sparse 46 . Walls et al 47 point out that these different components of trust can exist in tension, with social trust likely to emerge as multidimensional and fragmented, as a product of a reconciliation of competing ideas, knowledge and impressions. They introduce the important concept of ‘critical trust’ as an organising principle, something which lies on ‘Independent scientists’ remain some of the most trusted social actors in relation to communicating about controversial risk issues. It is entirely rational not to wish to place complete blind faith on any organization or individual who holds the power of life or death over us or over the environment. a continuum between outright scepticism (rejection) and uncritical emotional acceptance. Such a concept attempts to reconcile a situation in which people actually rely on risk managing institutions while simultaneously possessing a critical attitude toward the effectiveness, motivations or independence of the agency in question 43,48 . Again, from a policy perspective it is entirely rational not to wish to place complete blind faith on any organization or individual who holds the power of life or death over us or over the environment. And although for many policymakers the ‘reclamation of trust’ has become an explicit objective, this suggests that risk communication efforts that are aimed at directly increasing trust may not be universally effective in solving risk controversies 49 . Such policies could well be counterproductive where they are based on the incorrect assumption that trust can be simply manipulated in order to increase the acceptance of a controversial risk. If Beck and Giddens are right about the emergence of a risk society, risk communicators will have to find new ways of working under conditions of permanently eroded trust. Accordingly, policy advice today tends to stress the importance of analytic-deliberative engagement and dialogue as the means for exploring the values and perceptions underlying risk controversies and for exploring routes to better risk communication and conflict resolution 50, 51 (see also Chapter 5 and Chapter 9). Although such methods have an established empirical track-record when used to resolve local site-based facility siting and other controversies, scaling up to national-level questions such as national energy strategies or policies to tackle global environmental risks set a range of very difficult conceptual and methodological challenges 52 . Pidgeon and Fischhoff 8 argue, in the context of climate change risks, that all of this points to the need in the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, to develop novel strategic capacity and skills in risk communication and public engagement with science. This requires us to bring together expertise from fundamental domain sciences such as radiation protection, climate change, or biosciences, with the appropriate social sciences of decision analysis and risk communication.
Edmund Penning-Rowsell (University of Oxford), Paul Sayers (Sayers and Partners and University of Oxford) and Andrew Watkinson (University of East Anglia) 101 HIGH LEVEL CASE STUDY: FLOODING
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INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK, NOT AVOI
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FOREWORD Advances in science and te
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EDITOR AND CHAPTER AUTHORS 6 Editor
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8 CASE STUDY AUTHORS Framing Risk -
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Global Alliance for Vaccines and Im
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14 INTRODUCTION In today’s global
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16 Investors face additional risks
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18 unclear patent law), or barriers
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More problematically, system-wide r
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22 is unwilling or unable to undert
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24 innovation process, or one secto
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2 1. TRENDS IN INNOVATION AND GLOBA
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28 the body. Nanoparticles generate
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access to education that are occurr
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to seek opportunities for more subs
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34 Middle East and Africa mean that
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At their core, decisions are about
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38 CASE STUDY CONSISTENCY AND TRANS
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40 within Her Majesty’s Inspector
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42 liabilities. The coalition gover
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44 Advances in the life sciences co
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SECTION 2: UNCERTAINTY, COMMUNICATI
Page 49 and 50: Andy Stirling (Science Policy Resea
Page 51 and 52: as a whole, for seeding and selecti
Page 53 and 54: information concerning public polic
Page 55 and 56: Kingdom. It has 34 participating an
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Page 59 and 60: have been awarded in rational choic
Page 61 and 62: ecomes easier to accept and justify
Page 63 and 64: Tim O’Riordan (University of East
Page 65 and 66: CASE STUDY HUMAN RIGHTS AND RISK Ka
Page 67 and 68: give the impression that certain ki
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Page 71 and 72: David Spiegelhalter (University of
Page 73 and 74: course, means that 1% are violent,
Page 75 and 76: level was announced on 22 January 2
Page 77 and 78: Even in situations with limited evi
Page 79 and 80: Steve Elliott (Chemical Industries
Page 81 and 82: THE NGO PERSPECTIVE Harry Huyton (R
Page 84 and 85: SECTION 3: FRAMING RISK — THE HUM
Page 87 and 88: David Halpern and Owain Service (Be
Page 89 and 90: letter and discovered that this is
Page 91 and 92: measures have been put in place and
Page 93 and 94: Nick Pidgeon and Karen Henwood (Car
Page 95 and 96: equity of risk distribution, the pe
Page 97 and 98: individual include the emergence of
Page 99: domain of biosecurity risks. In the
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Page 105 and 106: 90% 80% Media scare stories linking
Page 107 and 108: Judith Petts (University of Southam
Page 109 and 110: The impact of intuition on response
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Page 113 and 114: more children, raising the risk of
Page 115 and 116: Nick Beckstead (University of Oxfor
Page 117 and 118: CASE STUDY POLICY, DECISION-MAKING
Page 119 and 120: might be developed, and what the li
Page 121 and 122: Julia Slingo (Met Office Chief Scie
Page 123 and 124: transport disruption, wind damage,
Page 125 and 126: the premiums that we have received
Page 127 and 128: Only three GM crops have been appro
Page 129 and 130: Joyce Tait (University of Edinburgh
Page 131 and 132: evidence used to support policy and
Page 133 and 134: 1). In essence, the more developed
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Page 137 and 138: Lisa Jardine (University College Lo
Page 139 and 140: debate, which enabled the non-scien
Page 141 and 142: again concluded that there was stil
Page 143 and 144: we had been at such pains to educat
Page 145 and 146: ANNEX: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Page 147 and 148: center of Paris has led to a comple
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3.3. The current difficulty faced b
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• How can we give entrepreneurs s
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As experienced by the World Trade O
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nanodashboard.nano.gov/. 77. See Ma
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41. Vanichkorn, S. and Banchongduan
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22. OECD. Dynamising National Innov
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engagement. London: Zed Books; 2005
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science and technology. Washington
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structural model. Risk Analysis 12(
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Chalmers, David John. (2010). “Th
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