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institutions. It should be interpreted broadly as new ways of
providing and creating services and products, as well as new
services and products themselves. It is likely to continue
to be the single most important source of economic
growth for the UK, and a central focus of any discussions
of our comparative advantage. Innovation in services —
which account for nearly four-fifths of the UK economy
and are experiencing high growth in productivity — will
be particularly important to the UK’s future economic
prosperity. These facts should be reflected in government
thinking — and ambition — for policies intended to foster
innovation.
Innovation policy is difficult to get right. Human
rationality is bounded and innovation, along with the factors
determining it, can be complex: Knightian uncertainty is
ubiquitous, time horizons may be long, and the evidence
about what works can be difficult to interpret 86 . Learning
from past experience in order to improve the innovation
system is difficult, and efforts to influence the system carry
their own risks. We should, therefore, be sceptical about
simplistic approaches, and take a broad view of process,
products and sectors. We should not insist on one theory
of innovation, or disproportionately favour one kind of
innovation (breakthrough vs. incremental), one phase of the
CASE STUDY
L’AQUILA
Chris Whitty (Chief Scientific Adviser, Department
for International Development) and Marcus Besley
(Government Office for Science)
In the early hours of 6 April 2009, an earthquake
devastated the medieval city of L’Aquila in central
Italy. L’Aquila’s residents were used to living in an
earthquake zone, and to taking precautions such as
sleeping in the car during periods of seismic activity. Yet
this time 309 people were killed.
Six days earlier, a meeting of earthquake experts had
been held in L’Aquila. In the margins, the deputy head of
Italy’s civil protection department was filmed saying that
the situation was favourable, and agreeing that everyone
should “go and have a glass of wine”. He and six scientists
were later prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter, on
the claim that 29 of the deaths were a direct result of
them underestimating and inappropriately communicating
the risks of a major earthquake. All seven were convicted
and sentenced to long prison terms, although the six
scientists have recently had their convictions overturned.
Those verdicts raised potentially serious questions
for scientific advice in other countries. In the UK,
government relies on having the best science to hand,
including in emergency situations. This happens through
multiple mechanisms: many scientists are employed as
civil servants or serve on advisory committees, but
external scientists also lend their expertise less formally,
as good citizens.
As a consequence of the trial, the Government Chief
Scientific Adviser asked a group of departmental Chief
Scientific Advisers to look into the implications of the
L’Aquila case for the UK. This resulted in speciallycommissioned
advice from government lawyers, an
independent barrister, and an expert in Scottish law. The
advice is due to be published towards the end of 2014 on
the GOV.UK website. It summarises the current position
in UK law, and covers all scientists providing advice to the
government, whether or not they are actually employed
by government.
The lawyers considered the various legal routes, both
civil and criminal, by which an allegation of negligence
in scientific advice could be pursued. Assuming that the
contested advice was given professionally, honestly, and
in good faith, they concluded that there are multiple legal
tests and high bars for any such action to succeed against
an individual scientist in the UK, and that the courts are
alive to the need not to stifle or discourage valuable
research.
For example, the infamous weather forecast before the
Great Storm of 1987, in which the public were told not
to worry about reports of a hurricane, did not lead to a
L’Aquila-style case. It would be hard to argue that such a
situation should do so.
This should provide reassurance against the scenario
of scientists around the country being hit with a flood
of legal claims, either civil or criminal. Nonetheless, the
lawyers noted that in a case of grossly negligent scientific
advice, prosecution for manslaughter (culpable homicide
in Scotland) is theoretically possible. It is important that
scientists communicate risk well, saying enough to be
helpful while avoiding blanket statements that may come
back to haunt them.
There has yet to be a test case analogous to L’Aquila
in the UK. But there is a need both to encourage
appropriate professional standards, and to protect
scientific advisers who make a sensible best estimate
that may later turn out to be wrong. The government
community of Chief Scientific Advisers is continuing to
develop and share good practice in this area.
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