14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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course, means that 1% are violent, and as there are roughly<br />
1,000,000 Londoners between the ages of 15 and 25, a little<br />
reflection suggests there are 10,000 seriously violent young<br />
people running around — not the image the communicators<br />
wanted to conjure up.<br />
It is generally argued that using relative measures is a<br />
manipulative way of communicating <strong>risk</strong>, because it has ben<br />
shown to increase the apparent importance of a particular<br />
action. Being told that regularly eating a bacon sandwich<br />
increases your lifetime <strong>risk</strong> of pancreatic cancer by 20% may<br />
be somewhat unconvincing if the baseline is extremely low<br />
and the bacon sandwich is rather pleasant.<br />
However, this situation can be reversed in acute lowprobability,<br />
high-impact events that occur regularly: we<br />
all take daily precautions when travelling, for example,<br />
which makes small <strong>risk</strong>s even smaller. This point was also<br />
dramatically illustrated when Italian earthquake advisors<br />
were convicted of involuntary manslaughter for issuing<br />
unduly reassuring messages to the residents of L’Aquila in<br />
2009, a few days before more than 300 people were killed<br />
in a major earthquake. The advice correctly said that the<br />
overall <strong>risk</strong> was low, but should also have emphasized that<br />
the relative <strong>risk</strong> was high: this would have enabled residents<br />
to adopt their own chosen level of precaution (see case<br />
study in Chapter 1 for further discussion of L’Aquila).<br />
Clearly both absolute and relative <strong>risk</strong>s are required. The<br />
important lesson from numerical <strong>risk</strong> communication is that<br />
one size does not fit all, and a variety of methods may be<br />
appropriate, with a hierarchy of numerical sophistication.<br />
3. Using words<br />
It is important to realize that words such as ‘likely’ or<br />
‘possible’ carry meaning beyond mere magnitude, and<br />
depends crucially on context. For example, the UK’s<br />
Terrorism Threat Level scale defines SEVERE as meaning<br />
“that a terrorist attack is highly likely”, and yet when this<br />
CASE STUDY<br />
NUCLEAR: THE SUBMARINER’S PERSPECTIVE<br />
Rear Admiral Nigel Guild (Chairman, Engineering Council)<br />
A<br />
nuclear submarine is one of<br />
the most complex engineering<br />
achievements known to man,<br />
and it contains a unique combination<br />
of potential hazards within a relatively<br />
small space. These hazards include structural and<br />
environmental issues common to all large ships, with<br />
the added problem that the vessel needs to remain<br />
stable under the water. To these challenges are added<br />
nuclear propulsion, explosives and, in the case of the<br />
deterrent submarine, nuclear weapons.<br />
The management of submarine safety is critical to<br />
the protection of submariners, the public and the<br />
environment. The Royal Navy’s approach to <strong>managing</strong><br />
the <strong>risk</strong>s presented by these potential hazards is<br />
to assess and mitigate them through the use of a<br />
probabilistic safety case. This safety case aggregates<br />
the assessment of <strong>risk</strong>s, so that there is ultimately<br />
an overview of <strong>risk</strong> for the whole submarine. This<br />
process relies on normal definitions of acceptable<br />
<strong>risk</strong> used by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE),<br />
along with widely used diagrams depicting the<br />
expectation of death per year against the number of<br />
people employed. HSE Basic Safety levels are used for<br />
the maximum <strong>risk</strong> that is normally allowable. Then<br />
the ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP)<br />
principle is deployed to continually reduce <strong>risk</strong> from<br />
each potential hazard, until the cost of further effort<br />
would be grossly disproportionate to the extra safety<br />
achieved.<br />
In practice, far greater resources are devoted to<br />
<strong>managing</strong> nuclear safety than for other potential<br />
submarine hazards with the same <strong>risk</strong> assessment. This<br />
is required by a public expectation of far greater <strong>risk</strong><br />
reduction for a potential nuclear hazard, because it is<br />
not generally understood and it is held in significant<br />
dread. To take a non-nuclear example, the <strong>risk</strong> of a<br />
seamanship accident, such as falling into the sea while<br />
working on the casing when the submarine is on the<br />
surface, is assessed in a similar way to any workplace<br />
potential hazard. In contrast to this, a potential nuclear<br />
event requires <strong>risk</strong> mitigation to achieve two orders<br />
of magnitude smaller <strong>risk</strong> assessment than would<br />
be sought for conventional <strong>risk</strong>s. Another way of<br />
expressing this is by applying the ALARP principle: the<br />
effort required before it would be considered grossly<br />
disproportionate to the extra nuclear safety achieved<br />
is about 100 times more than for other <strong>risk</strong>s.<br />
Using this logical approach, a consistent set of<br />
safety assessments for the whole submarine can<br />
be assembled and used to minimize <strong>risk</strong>s using the<br />
common language of health and safety assessment.<br />
Within the process, however, chosen <strong>risk</strong>s such as<br />
nuclear can be managed to different levels of ALARP<br />
in accordance with society’s expectation.<br />
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