14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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1<strong>14</strong><br />
people and institutions behave such that <strong>innovation</strong> achieves<br />
desired outcomes 31 . This framework privileges anticipation,<br />
reflection, deliberation and response 32 , placing an onus on<br />
innovators to reflect and listen to societal concerns and<br />
governance systems that develop social intelligence around<br />
the direction and control of technology 33 .<br />
The UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 34<br />
introduced the concept of continual ‘social intelligence’<br />
gathering as a preferred approach to understanding<br />
how societal views and responses to new technologies<br />
are developing, viewing one-off public engagement as<br />
often being limited by time and, importantly, context.<br />
The recommendation resonated with the international<br />
experience of participatory technology assessment — such<br />
as Real-Time Technology Assessment (RTTA) 35 , for example,<br />
an approach practised for over ten years by the Centre<br />
for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University<br />
— and the various attempts by technology-assessment<br />
organizations in Europe to open up assessment to more<br />
inclusive approaches. The Danish Board of Technology,<br />
for example, sought to combine its more formal role of<br />
assessing technologies with proactive efforts to foster<br />
public debates, particularly using consensus conferences. It<br />
is disappointing that RTTA and similar approaches have not<br />
gained real decision-making traction.<br />
Other chapters in this report highlight the important,<br />
indeed essential, role for communication and engagement<br />
in <strong>risk</strong> decision-making. In Chapter 5, Tim O’Riordan’s plea<br />
to hold a ‘wider conversation’ is tinged with concern for<br />
the demands that opening-up decisions on <strong>innovation</strong> and<br />
<strong>risk</strong> inherently implies. These demands are not simply in the<br />
effective discussion of the science, and the need for honesty<br />
about the uncertainties. Indeed, all of our <strong>evidence</strong> confirms<br />
that through discussion-based engagement, members of the<br />
public can readily engage with science and appreciate that<br />
certainty about outcomes is not possible.<br />
Conclusion – Responding to Culture and Motive<br />
This chapter has sought to show that social, economic,<br />
cultural and political contexts are fundamentally important<br />
to how people and institutions respond to <strong>risk</strong>. How<br />
institutions behave in the public interest has a significant<br />
impact. As Sykes and Macnaghten note: “opening a dialogue<br />
is never a public good in itself: its value depends on the<br />
political culture in which it is enacted” 36 . This was strongly<br />
evident in the case of the waste-strategy development in<br />
Hampshire and East Sussex, two geographically-close local<br />
authorities in the United Kingdom. In each area, the same<br />
waste management company attempted public engagement<br />
around the detailed planning of energy-from-waste plants.<br />
In Hampshire, there was strong political support, and the<br />
need for the technology had been subject to extensive<br />
public engagement — but in East Sussex the opposite was<br />
true. This background meant that it was more difficult for<br />
the company to engage with the public in East Sussex. Public<br />
engagement is never merely a suite of methods that can be<br />
rolled out from place-to-place, regardless of context 37 .<br />
The metaphor of the ‘field of play’ has been applied to<br />
Public engagement is<br />
never merely a suite of<br />
methods that can be<br />
rolled out from placeto-place,<br />
regardless of<br />
context.<br />
the idea of mediated <strong>risk</strong> communication 38 . Developed in<br />
response to the over-simplified view of the role of the<br />
media as perpetrators of the social amplification of <strong>risk</strong>s, the<br />
model sees audiences as active rather than passive receivers<br />
of messages. Government and state agencies, opposition<br />
parties, campaigning groups, corporations, scientific and<br />
expert communities as well as the media engage in a<br />
continual contest for public position and advantage.<br />
Communication and engagement has to be design-based and<br />
user-centered; that is based on an understanding of existing<br />
(and hence inherently changing) knowledge and beliefs. This<br />
requires detailed analysis over time of how different publics<br />
talk about and respond to highly specific and contextdependent<br />
<strong>risk</strong> issues.<br />
This is far easier to say than to do (as discussed in<br />
Chapters 5, 7 and 11). Although a ‘new governance agenda’<br />
(see Chapter 11) is evident, closing the gap between<br />
listening to views and concerns, and developing publiclytrusted<br />
policy responses around <strong>innovation</strong>, remains a<br />
serious challenge not only nationally but particularly in a<br />
trans-national context. This is because the opening up of<br />
decisions on <strong>innovation</strong> challenges preferred and embedded<br />
positions of expertise, power and authority.<br />
Ultimately, <strong>innovation</strong> may not be tolerated at a particular<br />
point in time for perfectly logical reasons that have far less<br />
to do with concerns about the potential <strong>risk</strong>s than with<br />
disquiet about institutional motives and behaviour, and<br />
perceived threats to the things that people value. There is<br />
an onus on decision-makers to proactively enhance their<br />
understanding of the power of context and to appreciate<br />
the common dimensions of responses, even between<br />
apparently unrelated <strong>risk</strong>s. There is an essential need to<br />
gather social intelligence over time rather than merely<br />
supporting one-off public engagement exercises, particularly<br />
where these have more to do with trying to persuade the<br />
public of the benefits and the safety of technology. Effective<br />
<strong>innovation</strong> will require a partnership between decisionmakers<br />
and the public that is characterized by listening,<br />
open and ongoing discussions, and trust. Of course, such<br />
characteristics take time and resources to develop and<br />
perfect. But expending such effort is likely to be more<br />
efficient and effective in supporting <strong>innovation</strong>.