14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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measures have been put in place and they are recognized<br />
to be harmless. Some people interpret these findings from<br />
behavioural science as demonstrating that ordinary people<br />
are irredeemably irrational, or incapable of understanding<br />
<strong>risk</strong>s. But the framing of human thought as irrational is itself<br />
potentially misleading for a couple of reasons.<br />
Firstly, many of these same effects enable us to process<br />
information and act quickly without the need to analyze<br />
information comprehensively. Think about how complex<br />
your life would be if you had to calculate the trajectory<br />
of a falling ball you would like to catch using mathematical<br />
equations rather than intuition and simple rules of thumb.<br />
Secondly, lessons from behavioural science do not just<br />
show us those situations in which individuals are prone to<br />
making errors. They can also show us how to devise systems<br />
and processes that support people (professionals and nonspecialists<br />
alike) in making better decisions for themselves.<br />
This was the central premise behind Richard Thaler and<br />
Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge 6 . They show how policymakers<br />
can change the ‘choice architecture’ to help people to make<br />
choices which are better for them and that they are less<br />
likely to later regret. For example, one of the best and most<br />
effective examples of a ‘nudge’ is to change the way that<br />
a default option is set, in order to overcome our natural<br />
tendency to prefer rewards today rather than those that we<br />
receive in the future (‘hyperbolic discounting’), and more<br />
practically, our dislike of doing paperwork. Recognition of<br />
this tendency was behind the UK government’s decision to<br />
automatically enrol people on to company pension plans,<br />
so that the default switched from having to ‘opt in’ to<br />
having the option to ‘opt out’. The result: overnight, pension<br />
enrolment increased from 61 to 83% — and to more than<br />
90% among those who were eligible.<br />
The Behavioural Insights Team has, over the past four<br />
years, put in place dozens of randomized controlled trials,<br />
encompassing hundreds of variations, which show how<br />
apparently small changes such as these can have dramatic<br />
impacts on how people take decisions. We have shown,<br />
for example, how changing the way that we communicate<br />
messages in areas from tax letters to organ donation can<br />
increase compliance and sign up rates.<br />
We have also shown how to begin embedding this same<br />
kind of thinking in the broader policy making process. For<br />
example, the midata project, which we launched with the<br />
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, will enable<br />
consumers to access information about themselves that<br />
is held by firms. We believe this will herald the start of a<br />
consumer revolution, as third-party developers design apps<br />
and websites to support consumers’ decisions based on easyto-access<br />
data: for example, your energy consumption data<br />
will reveal which new tariff is best for you. (See the case study<br />
on ‘social machines’ for further discussion of web-enabled<br />
data sharing).<br />
We have also worked with the Department of Health on<br />
areas such as electronic cigarettes (see case study), precisely<br />
because the behavioural <strong>evidence</strong> shows it is easy for people<br />
to quit smoking if they can substitute cigarettes for another<br />
product that feels and looks the same.<br />
Changing the way that we<br />
communicate messages<br />
in areas from tax letters<br />
to organ donation can<br />
increase compliance and<br />
sign up rates.<br />
Some behavioural scientists rightly argue that we can<br />
educate people to become ‘<strong>risk</strong> savvy’ by providing people<br />
and professionals with information in ways that they can<br />
intuitively process and understand. Gerd Gigerenzer, for<br />
example, has shown how doctors and patients routinely<br />
misunderstand information about cancer screening. In a study<br />
of prostrate cancer in the United States, Gigerenzer found<br />
that many people, including health professionals, routinely<br />
misunderstand the relative <strong>risk</strong>s of different procedures.<br />
For example, ‘survival rate’ data is often used to show the<br />
relative efficacy of screening, but this can be highly misleading<br />
as individuals diagnosed earlier than they would otherwise<br />
have been as a result of screening will naturally tend to have<br />
a higher survival date, but not necessarily a lower mortality<br />
rate.<br />
Screening for prostrate cancer in the United States does<br />
not appear to reduce the overall age-adjusted deaths, partly<br />
because it increases the number of people who have a<br />
false positive diagnosis that results in unnecessary surgery.<br />
Presenting information in terms of relative <strong>risk</strong>s and survival<br />
rates turns out to be confusing and unhelpful. In contrast,<br />
simple tools like icon boxes that show a population of 100<br />
men and what happens to each can radically improve people’s<br />
understanding of the relative <strong>risk</strong>s of particular actions<br />
In conclusion, the systematic study of how people<br />
estimate <strong>risk</strong>s and probabilities in everyday life has proven<br />
to be extremely rich territory. It has revolutionized several<br />
academic fields and led to Daniel Kahneman being the first<br />
psychologist to be awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in<br />
Economic Sciences. It has also served as a key element of the<br />
work of the Behavioural Insights Team, established in 2010<br />
in the UK Cabinet Office, and increasingly being applied by<br />
governments across the world.<br />
It should also serve as a subtle caution to all of us:<br />
policymakers and experts ourselves use these same mental<br />
shortcuts. We are prone to overconfidence; to hold to<br />
previous estimates and beliefs, even if arbitrary; and to be<br />
strongly influenced by the dynamics of the group around us.<br />
That is why the Behavioural Insights Team was established<br />
in the first place: to help policymakers understand how<br />
they could draw on ideas from the behavioural sciences to<br />
encourage, support and enable people to make better choices<br />
for themselves.<br />
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