14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
has necessitated a combination of <strong>evidence</strong>-informed <strong>risk</strong><br />
analysis and wide stakeholder consultation 4 .<br />
The UK government’s role in <strong>managing</strong> public <strong>risk</strong> has<br />
been the subject of considerable scrutiny over recent<br />
decades 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 . In this chapter, we summarize some of the<br />
discussions since the early 1990s to illustrate progress<br />
in this area, and as the basis for the forward trajectory<br />
discussed elsewhere in this volume. The general shift over<br />
the years has been from recognizing public <strong>risk</strong> as a product<br />
of market failure (and thus a subject for central control)<br />
to a more devolved approach to measured <strong>risk</strong>-taking and<br />
value creation, with accountabilities distributed between<br />
various actors armed with high-quality <strong>evidence</strong> and<br />
structured accountabilities for shared <strong>risk</strong> and opportunity<br />
management. Public sector reform and modernization,<br />
the emphasis on <strong>risk</strong>-based regulation, and the current<br />
approach to <strong>risk</strong> and cost sharing in government all reflect<br />
this shift. The social processes of recognizing and accepting<br />
accountabilities for <strong>risk</strong> management and of delegating and<br />
monitoring these are critical to ensuring that <strong>risk</strong> reduction<br />
is secured.<br />
Managing public <strong>risk</strong><br />
We recognize <strong>risk</strong> as a multidimensional concept with<br />
social, financial, human and natural resource implications,<br />
and with the potential for positive and negative outcomes.<br />
Society cannot function without taking measured <strong>risk</strong>s. That<br />
is how <strong>innovation</strong>s, discoveries, industrial endeavour and<br />
societal developments have been secured. Our industrial and<br />
civic societies are challenged when <strong>innovation</strong> is pursued,<br />
however, because social and economic activity inevitably<br />
comes with some <strong>risk</strong> attached. We have historically looked<br />
to our government to manage public <strong>risk</strong> in situations<br />
where the market fails 10 . For public <strong>risk</strong>s, those that impact<br />
on goods that are readily available to members of the<br />
community, government departments have developed and<br />
retained expertise to evaluate and manage <strong>risk</strong>, whether<br />
directly or indirectly, ensuring the maintenance of the public<br />
good 11 . That said, there is a wide variety of views on the<br />
effectiveness of government capacity in <strong>risk</strong> management<br />
and in its maturity in handling public <strong>risk</strong>, particularly in a<br />
climate of cost constraint.<br />
The United Kingdom’s stance to <strong>risk</strong> and its management<br />
has evolved considerably, and has been highly influenced<br />
by the socio-political landscape. The nature of a <strong>risk</strong> or<br />
opportunity, its familiarity, location and distribution, all<br />
influence how <strong>risk</strong> is perceived (see Chapter 9 for a richer<br />
discussion of context, behaviour and agency). Politicians will<br />
hear public demands for action, and the political landscape<br />
— with all its tensions and influences — frequently<br />
determines management action. These decisions are usually,<br />
but not exclusively, informed by the <strong>evidence</strong> base. Political<br />
stances also influence how <strong>risk</strong>s are portrayed; and whether<br />
the government adopts a directive or precautionary<br />
approach, or one that is more <strong>risk</strong>-seeking in order to<br />
capitalize upon the potential benefits 12 .<br />
The assessment of public <strong>risk</strong> alone is insufficient as<br />
a basis for <strong>managing</strong> it. Public <strong>risk</strong>s must be assessed,<br />
The United Kingdom’s<br />
stance to <strong>risk</strong> and its<br />
management has evolved<br />
considerably.<br />
managed, communicated and governed: the political, social<br />
and organizational aspects of sound <strong>risk</strong> management are<br />
as critical as the technocratic analysis of <strong>risk</strong>. Individual<br />
and organizational accountabilities and arrangements<br />
for <strong>managing</strong> <strong>risk</strong> prove critical and in practice, the<br />
responsibility for <strong>managing</strong> most public <strong>risk</strong> is shared<br />
between government, other organizations and the public.<br />
An overriding theme of national scale <strong>risk</strong> events has<br />
been the failures in <strong>risk</strong> management that occur when<br />
shared responsibilities for <strong>managing</strong> <strong>risk</strong> are unclear, where<br />
accountabilities are blurred or where the complexities of<br />
systems are insufficiently understood. Fragile, interconnected<br />
and excessively lean systems are vulnerable, especially where<br />
there is a loss of oversight or where behavioural incentives<br />
within systems, or among their custodians, are at odds with<br />
maintaining systemic resilience to shock. Successive failures<br />
in systemic <strong>risk</strong> management and oversight by institutions,<br />
as illustrated by the global financial crisis (see case study),<br />
can cause pervasive, substantive and long-lasting damage that<br />
erodes public confidence.<br />
A useful starting point for the recent chronology is<br />
the Royal Society’s influential 1992 report Risk: analysis,<br />
perception and management 13 , chaired by Sir Frederick<br />
Warner FRS, an international authority in the field, which<br />
was published as an update to a 1983 report on <strong>risk</strong><br />
assessment practice. The temporal context of the Royal<br />
Society’s 1992 report was a catalogue of industrial disasters,<br />
including the Piper Alpha oil rig fire in the North Sea, the<br />
capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise, and the King’s<br />
Cross underground station fire — all national tragedies that<br />
had raised considerable disquiet about the management<br />
of <strong>risk</strong> by a variety of actors. The Royal Society sought<br />
to address developments in <strong>risk</strong> assessment practice, to<br />
bridge the gap between quantified and perceived <strong>risk</strong>, and<br />
to comment on the merits of <strong>risk</strong>-benefit trade-offs. The<br />
latter parts of the report reflected an increased emphasis<br />
on <strong>risk</strong> communication (updated in Chapter 8 by Nick<br />
Pidgeon, a contributor to the 1992 report) and signalled the<br />
emergence of an analytic-deliberative approach to decision<br />
making that had been in discussion since the 1970s (refs. <strong>14</strong>,<br />
15).<br />
Up until this point, one might argue that <strong>risk</strong> management<br />
had been deployed as a defensive approach to reassure<br />
publics that consideration had been given to a <strong>risk</strong> and<br />
that action could be taken — displaying a tendency to<br />
manage the perception of uncertainty and limit blame.<br />
Hopefully, this tenor of approach is now a thing of the<br />
past. A fundamental requirement for all <strong>risk</strong> analyses, once<br />
37