1<strong>14</strong> people and institutions behave such that <strong>innovation</strong> achieves desired outcomes 31 . This framework privileges anticipation, reflection, deliberation and response 32 , placing an onus on innovators to reflect and listen to societal concerns and governance systems that develop social intelligence around the direction and control of technology 33 . The UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 34 introduced the concept of continual ‘social intelligence’ gathering as a preferred approach to understanding how societal views and responses to new technologies are developing, viewing one-off public engagement as often being limited by time and, importantly, context. The recommendation resonated with the international experience of participatory technology assessment — such as Real-Time Technology Assessment (RTTA) 35 , for example, an approach practised for over ten years by the Centre for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University — and the various attempts by technology-assessment organizations in Europe to open up assessment to more inclusive approaches. The Danish Board of Technology, for example, sought to combine its more formal role of assessing technologies with proactive efforts to foster public debates, particularly using consensus conferences. It is disappointing that RTTA and similar approaches have not gained real decision-making traction. Other chapters in this report highlight the important, indeed essential, role for communication and engagement in <strong>risk</strong> decision-making. In Chapter 5, Tim O’Riordan’s plea to hold a ‘wider conversation’ is tinged with concern for the demands that opening-up decisions on <strong>innovation</strong> and <strong>risk</strong> inherently implies. These demands are not simply in the effective discussion of the science, and the need for honesty about the uncertainties. Indeed, all of our <strong>evidence</strong> confirms that through discussion-based engagement, members of the public can readily engage with science and appreciate that certainty about outcomes is not possible. Conclusion – Responding to Culture and Motive This chapter has sought to show that social, economic, cultural and political contexts are fundamentally important to how people and institutions respond to <strong>risk</strong>. How institutions behave in the public interest has a significant impact. As Sykes and Macnaghten note: “opening a dialogue is never a public good in itself: its value depends on the political culture in which it is enacted” 36 . This was strongly evident in the case of the waste-strategy development in Hampshire and East Sussex, two geographically-close local authorities in the United Kingdom. In each area, the same waste management company attempted public engagement around the detailed planning of energy-from-waste plants. In Hampshire, there was strong political support, and the need for the technology had been subject to extensive public engagement — but in East Sussex the opposite was true. This background meant that it was more difficult for the company to engage with the public in East Sussex. Public engagement is never merely a suite of methods that can be rolled out from place-to-place, regardless of context 37 . The metaphor of the ‘field of play’ has been applied to Public engagement is never merely a suite of methods that can be rolled out from placeto-place, regardless of context. the idea of mediated <strong>risk</strong> communication 38 . Developed in response to the over-simplified view of the role of the media as perpetrators of the social amplification of <strong>risk</strong>s, the model sees audiences as active rather than passive receivers of messages. Government and state agencies, opposition parties, campaigning groups, corporations, scientific and expert communities as well as the media engage in a continual contest for public position and advantage. Communication and engagement has to be design-based and user-centered; that is based on an understanding of existing (and hence inherently changing) knowledge and beliefs. This requires detailed analysis over time of how different publics talk about and respond to highly specific and contextdependent <strong>risk</strong> issues. This is far easier to say than to do (as discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 11). Although a ‘new governance agenda’ (see Chapter 11) is evident, closing the gap between listening to views and concerns, and developing publiclytrusted policy responses around <strong>innovation</strong>, remains a serious challenge not only nationally but particularly in a trans-national context. This is because the opening up of decisions on <strong>innovation</strong> challenges preferred and embedded positions of expertise, power and authority. Ultimately, <strong>innovation</strong> may not be tolerated at a particular point in time for perfectly logical reasons that have far less to do with concerns about the potential <strong>risk</strong>s than with disquiet about institutional motives and behaviour, and perceived threats to the things that people value. There is an onus on decision-makers to proactively enhance their understanding of the power of context and to appreciate the common dimensions of responses, even between apparently unrelated <strong>risk</strong>s. There is an essential need to gather social intelligence over time rather than merely supporting one-off public engagement exercises, particularly where these have more to do with trying to persuade the public of the benefits and the safety of technology. Effective <strong>innovation</strong> will require a partnership between decisionmakers and the public that is characterized by listening, open and ongoing discussions, and trust. Of course, such characteristics take time and resources to develop and perfect. But expending such effort is likely to be more efficient and effective in supporting <strong>innovation</strong>.
Nick Beckstead (University of Oxford) and Toby Ord (University of Oxford) 115 CHAPTER 10: MANAGING EXISTENTIAL RISK FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES Despite the political and organizational challenges, policymakers need to take account of low-probability, high-impact <strong>risk</strong>s that could threaten the premature extinction of humanity.
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INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK, NOT AVOI
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FOREWORD Advances in science and te
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EDITOR AND CHAPTER AUTHORS 6 Editor
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8 CASE STUDY AUTHORS Framing Risk -
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Global Alliance for Vaccines and Im
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14 INTRODUCTION In today’s global
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16 Investors face additional risks
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18 unclear patent law), or barriers
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More problematically, system-wide r
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22 is unwilling or unable to undert
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24 innovation process, or one secto
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2 1. TRENDS IN INNOVATION AND GLOBA
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28 the body. Nanoparticles generate
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access to education that are occurr
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to seek opportunities for more subs
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34 Middle East and Africa mean that
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At their core, decisions are about
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38 CASE STUDY CONSISTENCY AND TRANS
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40 within Her Majesty’s Inspector
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42 liabilities. The coalition gover
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44 Advances in the life sciences co
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SECTION 2: UNCERTAINTY, COMMUNICATI
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Andy Stirling (Science Policy Resea
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as a whole, for seeding and selecti
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information concerning public polic
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Kingdom. It has 34 participating an
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Cinderella, too often uninvited to
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have been awarded in rational choic
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ecomes easier to accept and justify
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science and technology. Washington
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structural model. Risk Analysis 12(
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Chalmers, David John. (2010). “Th
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