14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence

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CASE STUDY AUM SHINRIKYO AND THE MOVE TO VIOLENCE Matthew Francis and Kim Knott (Lancaster University) 92 The case of Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) demonstrates the complex and dynamic factors that contribute to explaining extreme criminal behaviour. Aum began in 1984 as a small yoga group, but within ten years it had grown to over 10,000 members with the facilities to produce weaponized chemicals, templates for AK47s and even a military helicopter. In 1995, it released the nerve agent sarin on the Tokyo underground network. Due to an error in its production, fatalities were limited to thirteen, with 5,000 injured. Aum had used scientists among its membership to produce the sarin (as well as anthrax and botulism spores), whilst simultaneously elevating the idea of sarin as a ‘sacred weapon’ within the group’s beliefs and practices. This fitted within a wider narrative of impending apocalypse that Aum members believed only they would survive, and that led to a culture of group paranoia. Accusations of kidnapping and murder had been made against Aum in the early 1990s, but law enforcement authorities were indisposed to act because of the constitutional protections given to religions in Japan at the time (which were subsequently amended). What can we learn? 1. Discursive markers can be identified in Aum’s ideological development, and these can be compared to those of other threat groups. Aum’s beliefs were publicly accessible (in Japanese and English), and included repeated mention of sarin and increasing focus on apocalyptic conflict. They made reference to Aum’s dichotomous world view (good versus evil, ‘them’ versus ‘us’); its apocalyptic sense of emergency; its lack of common ground with wider society; the symbolic significance attributed to its actions and methods; its violent traditions; and the denial of the innocence of its victims. Not all groups planning violent action will display every trait in their public discourse, but where present they may signal a cause for concern. Although it is undoubtedly easier to reconstruct a developmental trail after the fact, lessons may nevertheless be learned from this example that can be applied to future cases. 2. Beliefs are not enough — context is important. In the Japanese context, Aum appealed to a young audience dissatisfied with perceived materialism and the strongly rationalist ethic of work and education. Different factors operate in the United Kingdom, which lead to different kinds of risks. The special protections given to religions under the Japanese constitution before the Aum incident have never applied in the United Kingdom, and law enforcement agencies would have been able to act sooner on evidence of violence, kidnapping and murder. The Aum case shows the importance of understanding contextual as well as cultural factors in the move to extreme beliefs and behaviours. 3. Beliefs are not enough — resources are important. As with other violent groups, Aum’s actions and their timing were influenced by external events: the attack on the Tokyo underground was an attempt to deter an impending police investigation. Sarin was identified as a sacred weapon not because it had particular theological significance, but because it was available. Having tried and failed to source the ebola virus and nuclear material, Aum worked with what was to hand. 4. Uncertainty leads to greater extremism. Aum’s pessimism, apocalyptic predictions and violence grew in tandem with increasing uncertainty about members’ commitment and disillusionment, legal threats, police attention and media lampooning. Psychological research on extremism suggests that individuals are attracted to extreme movements during times of personal uncertainty, and that groups develop sharper, more negative contrasts between members and nonmembers at times of collective uncertainty. In summary • Groups faced with uncertainty are attracted to more extreme beliefs; • Extreme movements are attractive to those afflicted by personal uncertainty; • Risks are very much a product of ideological, historical and environmental contexts; • The resources available to a group affect the nature of their threat; • Regulatory approaches to risk can themselves create risks of their own.
Nick Pidgeon and Karen Henwood (Cardiff University) 93 CHAPTER 8: PERCEPTIONS OF RISK As trust cuts across all of the main approaches to risk perceptions, policymakers need to develop novel strategic capacity and skills in risk communication and public engagement with science.
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INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK, NOT AVOI
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FOREWORD Advances in science and te
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EDITOR AND CHAPTER AUTHORS 6 Editor
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8 CASE STUDY AUTHORS Framing Risk -
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Global Alliance for Vaccines and Im
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14 INTRODUCTION In today’s global
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16 Investors face additional risks
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18 unclear patent law), or barriers
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More problematically, system-wide r
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22 is unwilling or unable to undert
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24 innovation process, or one secto
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2 1. TRENDS IN INNOVATION AND GLOBA
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28 the body. Nanoparticles generate
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access to education that are occurr
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to seek opportunities for more subs
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34 Middle East and Africa mean that
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At their core, decisions are about
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38 CASE STUDY CONSISTENCY AND TRANS
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40 within Her Majesty’s Inspector
Page 42 and 43: 42 liabilities. The coalition gover
Page 44 and 45: 44 Advances in the life sciences co
Page 46 and 47: SECTION 2: UNCERTAINTY, COMMUNICATI
Page 49 and 50: Andy Stirling (Science Policy Resea
Page 51 and 52: as a whole, for seeding and selecti
Page 53 and 54: information concerning public polic
Page 55 and 56: Kingdom. It has 34 participating an
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Page 59 and 60: have been awarded in rational choic
Page 61 and 62: ecomes easier to accept and justify
Page 63 and 64: Tim O’Riordan (University of East
Page 65 and 66: CASE STUDY HUMAN RIGHTS AND RISK Ka
Page 67 and 68: give the impression that certain ki
Page 69 and 70: adioactive waste in many countries
Page 71 and 72: David Spiegelhalter (University of
Page 73 and 74: course, means that 1% are violent,
Page 75 and 76: level was announced on 22 January 2
Page 77 and 78: Even in situations with limited evi
Page 79 and 80: Steve Elliott (Chemical Industries
Page 81 and 82: THE NGO PERSPECTIVE Harry Huyton (R
Page 84 and 85: SECTION 3: FRAMING RISK — THE HUM
Page 87 and 88: David Halpern and Owain Service (Be
Page 89 and 90: letter and discovered that this is
Page 91: measures have been put in place and
Page 95 and 96: equity of risk distribution, the pe
Page 97 and 98: individual include the emergence of
Page 99 and 100: domain of biosecurity risks. In the
Page 101 and 102: Edmund Penning-Rowsell (University
Page 103 and 104: — that is, governed by random pro
Page 105 and 106: 90% 80% Media scare stories linking
Page 107 and 108: Judith Petts (University of Southam
Page 109 and 110: The impact of intuition on response
Page 111 and 112: policy has moved towards less-inten
Page 113 and 114: more children, raising the risk of
Page 115 and 116: Nick Beckstead (University of Oxfor
Page 117 and 118: CASE STUDY POLICY, DECISION-MAKING
Page 119 and 120: might be developed, and what the li
Page 121 and 122: Julia Slingo (Met Office Chief Scie
Page 123 and 124: transport disruption, wind damage,
Page 125 and 126: the premiums that we have received
Page 127 and 128: Only three GM crops have been appro
Page 129 and 130: Joyce Tait (University of Edinburgh
Page 131 and 132: evidence used to support policy and
Page 133 and 134: 1). In essence, the more developed
Page 135 and 136: that engage with policy decisions o
Page 137 and 138: Lisa Jardine (University College Lo
Page 139 and 140: debate, which enabled the non-scien
Page 141 and 142: again concluded that there was stil
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we had been at such pains to educat
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ANNEX: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
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center of Paris has led to a comple
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production of unconventional hydroc
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3.3. The current difficulty faced b
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• How can we give entrepreneurs s
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As experienced by the World Trade O
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nanodashboard.nano.gov/. 77. See Ma
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41. Vanichkorn, S. and Banchongduan
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22. OECD. Dynamising National Innov
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engagement. London: Zed Books; 2005
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science and technology. Washington
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structural model. Risk Analysis 12(
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Chalmers, David John. (2010). “Th
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