14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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Similarly, a recent report for the Climate Outreach and<br />
Information Network 20 argued for the importance of<br />
identifying the overlap between the values underpinning<br />
centre-right conservatism in the United Kingdom and<br />
those which are congruent with sustainability, such as an<br />
emphasis on community well-being, intergenerational duty<br />
and a representation of the environment not as a ‘service<br />
provider’ but as something that people have a duty to<br />
protect. Social values and discourses also shape how men<br />
and women orient towards science and technology, and are<br />
being explored as explanations for the so-called ‘gender<br />
effect’ in <strong>risk</strong> perception — the observation that some men<br />
come to see environmental and technological <strong>risk</strong>s as less<br />
threatening than other groups in society, including most<br />
women 21, 22 .<br />
Arguably just as important to thinking about cultural<br />
issues and <strong>risk</strong> has been the work of Ulrich Beck 23 and<br />
Anthony Giddens 24 in their discussion of ‘Risk Society’.<br />
Risk society theory starts from an analysis of the macrostructural<br />
conditions and consequences of contemporary<br />
(late-modern) industrialized Western society. The claim<br />
is that late-modernity has been accompanied by the<br />
emergence of new classes of all-pervasive and ‘invisible’<br />
<strong>risk</strong>s, experienced only indirectly through expert systems<br />
of knowledge — we may be exposed to <strong>risk</strong>s, but can never<br />
fully comprehend their technological and environmental<br />
causes.<br />
According to Beck and Giddens, the consequences for the<br />
CASE STUDY<br />
MANAGING RISK PERCEPTION OF AUTONOMOUS<br />
TECHNOLOGIES: THE DOCKLANDS LIGHT RAILWAY<br />
Mike Esbester (University of Portsmouth)<br />
96<br />
Introducing autonomous technologies — those<br />
which are not directly controlled by human<br />
operators — poses significant challenges, particularly<br />
regarding people’s perceptions of the dangers to<br />
which they might be exposed. This case study focuses<br />
on London’s Docklands Light Railway (DLR), and<br />
considers how the automatic technology of driverless<br />
trains was presented to the public. It explores how the<br />
<strong>risk</strong>s conceivably posed by the lack of human drivers<br />
were perceived and addressed, and is used to suggest<br />
lessons for the introduction of future autonomous<br />
technologies.<br />
The DLR is an urban mass transit system, proposed<br />
in the early 1980s and opened in 1987. It operates on<br />
a track separated from other transport users — unlike<br />
a tram, for example, it does not run along streets. This<br />
meant that it was possible to run driverless trains<br />
controlled by computer programs, though a single<br />
member of staff travelled on board to operate doors<br />
and check tickets.<br />
Driverless trains brought with them the potential<br />
perception that they were in some way dangerous, as<br />
nobody was in control. However, the records available<br />
show no great public concern about the driverless<br />
technology. There were fears, but they were mitigated<br />
or addressed by those promoting the DLR both before<br />
and during the system’s introduction, until the DLR’s<br />
safety record was established in practice.<br />
Proactive communication was key: explanations of<br />
the system, its technology and the associated failsafes<br />
tried to remove concerns about the lack of<br />
drivers. Exhibitions of trains and promotional literature put<br />
forward both the positives of the DLR and the negatives<br />
of traditional surface level transportation. They noted (but<br />
didn’t stress unduly) the potential for human control if need<br />
arose. Leaflets and newspaper features noted that it was<br />
possible for the member of staff on board to drive the train<br />
and that the system was overseen by humans in the control<br />
centre.<br />
Potential concerns about the safety of driverless<br />
technology were addressed by publicity surrounding<br />
the trials of the DLR, which stressed their extensive<br />
and thorough nature. Significantly, the novelty of the<br />
technology was downplayed. Instead, the DLR’s proponents<br />
acknowledged the debts owed to existing automatic<br />
technologies that the public might be familiar with, in a bid<br />
to demonstrate the tried and tested nature of such systems.<br />
This included the Victoria underground line, which had used<br />
a version of automatic train operation since 1968.<br />
Finally, perceptions of <strong>risk</strong> were ameliorated by placing<br />
the system under the regulation of the Railway Inspectorate,<br />
the state agency responsible for overseeing safety (including<br />
granting permission to operate new lines). The state,<br />
effectively, acted as guarantor on the safety of the DLR.<br />
These factors suggest a number of aspects to explore<br />
when introducing new autonomous technologies, in order<br />
to address public concerns about potential negative impacts.<br />
The public is likely to be interested in new technologies,<br />
and may well approach them with an open mind and<br />
sophisticated (and varied) perceptions of <strong>risk</strong>s. Therefore<br />
providing information at each stage of the process is likely<br />
to be beneficial. Concerns should be acknowledged and