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14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence

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More problematically, system-wide rollouts of ideas like<br />

the entrepreneurial university may pose substantial <strong>risk</strong>s.<br />

Innovation scholars warn that the architecture of the<br />

institutions that organize academic research is old and<br />

poorly understood. Undertaking experiments in institutional<br />

design at large scales may result in prolonged slowdowns in<br />

<strong>innovation</strong> and growth 55 . For example, the new incentives for<br />

commercialization <strong>risk</strong> crowding out the basic research that<br />

expands the boundaries of future <strong>innovation</strong> and economic<br />

growth, with unknown long-term effects 56 . Such pioneering<br />

basic research as the investigations into the Higgs Boson,<br />

jellyfish Green Fluorescent Protein, and mammalian gene<br />

targeting (the latter two generated new tools that now<br />

underpin modern biomedical research), each of which<br />

recently resulted in a Nobel Prize, might not have been<br />

funded in today’s short-termist, <strong>risk</strong>-intolerant <strong>innovation</strong><br />

system 57 , where “results” are often measured in a narrow<br />

way such as counting the number of patents or papers.<br />

(iii) Individuals and behaviour<br />

Psychological factors shape the decisions people make about<br />

<strong>innovation</strong>, across all institutions — both public and private<br />

— and across all levels, from teachers, to scientists and<br />

engineers, to their managers, and to policymakers.<br />

Individuals tend to be loss averse 58 , and this may<br />

contribute to reduced <strong>innovation</strong>. When business is<br />

going smoothly, firms tend to neglect the uncertainties of<br />

<strong>innovation</strong> and favour the sure-thing of business-as-usual.<br />

The need to innovate becomes more salient once outcomes<br />

have begun deteriorating, by which point it can be difficult<br />

to innovate rapidly enough. Blackberry’s failure to maintain<br />

market share is one widely cited example of <strong>innovation</strong><br />

neglect 59 .<br />

Governments may also neglect <strong>innovation</strong> until crises<br />

arise, leading to wildly fluctuating — and therefore<br />

highly inefficient — patterns of investment. This was<br />

seen, for example, with the rise in public investment in<br />

CASE STUDY<br />

THE HIGH VALUE MANUFACTURING CATAPULT<br />

Dick Elsy (Chief Executive, High Value Manufacturing Catapult)<br />

20<br />

The High Value Manufacturing Catapult (HVMC),<br />

the first “catapult” centre to be opened, just<br />

three years ago, helps commercialise innovative<br />

manufacturing ideas. It combines seven centres of<br />

industrial <strong>innovation</strong> across Britain, bringing together<br />

the following capabilities:<br />

• Provides companies with access to<br />

world-class facilities and skills to help scale<br />

up and prove high-value manufacturing<br />

processes;<br />

• Develops a network of leading<br />

suppliers who contribute to key UK<br />

industry supply chains;<br />

• Brings industry, government and<br />

research together around a shared goal<br />

to make the UK an attractive place to<br />

invest in manufacturing.<br />

The Catapult’s financial model works on the basis of<br />

shared <strong>risk</strong>, with funding coming from three sources:<br />

1. Government core funding;<br />

2. Industry funding;<br />

3. Competitively won collaborative Research and<br />

Development (e.g. Horizon 2020 projects).<br />

Government funding helps to give industry confidence<br />

to take the kind of technological <strong>risk</strong>s from which it<br />

would normally shy away. Industry can access publiclyfunded<br />

manufacturing equipment and skills and has<br />

greater freedom to experiment, develop these radical<br />

concepts and learn from experience.<br />

The uptake of the HVMC has exceeded expectations<br />

and all of the commercial targets agreed at the outset<br />

have been surpassed. Industry funding has reached 45%<br />

with collaborative R&D at 30% and government core<br />

funding representing 25% of the total. The<br />

Catapult is now examining ways to secure this<br />

funding sustainably.<br />

In the past 12 months the HVMC has<br />

attracted:<br />

• 1515 private sector clients;<br />

• 1012 projects;<br />

• 1500+ SME engagements;<br />

• £224m total income;<br />

• £60m of <strong>innovation</strong> income accessed by<br />

SMEs;<br />

• £180m order book with >50% competitively won<br />

collaborative R&D;<br />

• 1250+ staff.<br />

As social scientists, we are interested in why institutions<br />

such as this are successful at fostering <strong>innovation</strong>,<br />

as this can help with future institutional design. The<br />

reasons behind the HVMC’s apparent success are likely<br />

to include the following: it enables <strong>risk</strong>s to be shared<br />

between different organizations; it reduces some of<br />

those <strong>risk</strong>s; and it provides a place where specialised<br />

and complementary skills can come together and grow.

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