14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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More problematically, system-wide rollouts of ideas like<br />
the entrepreneurial university may pose substantial <strong>risk</strong>s.<br />
Innovation scholars warn that the architecture of the<br />
institutions that organize academic research is old and<br />
poorly understood. Undertaking experiments in institutional<br />
design at large scales may result in prolonged slowdowns in<br />
<strong>innovation</strong> and growth 55 . For example, the new incentives for<br />
commercialization <strong>risk</strong> crowding out the basic research that<br />
expands the boundaries of future <strong>innovation</strong> and economic<br />
growth, with unknown long-term effects 56 . Such pioneering<br />
basic research as the investigations into the Higgs Boson,<br />
jellyfish Green Fluorescent Protein, and mammalian gene<br />
targeting (the latter two generated new tools that now<br />
underpin modern biomedical research), each of which<br />
recently resulted in a Nobel Prize, might not have been<br />
funded in today’s short-termist, <strong>risk</strong>-intolerant <strong>innovation</strong><br />
system 57 , where “results” are often measured in a narrow<br />
way such as counting the number of patents or papers.<br />
(iii) Individuals and behaviour<br />
Psychological factors shape the decisions people make about<br />
<strong>innovation</strong>, across all institutions — both public and private<br />
— and across all levels, from teachers, to scientists and<br />
engineers, to their managers, and to policymakers.<br />
Individuals tend to be loss averse 58 , and this may<br />
contribute to reduced <strong>innovation</strong>. When business is<br />
going smoothly, firms tend to neglect the uncertainties of<br />
<strong>innovation</strong> and favour the sure-thing of business-as-usual.<br />
The need to innovate becomes more salient once outcomes<br />
have begun deteriorating, by which point it can be difficult<br />
to innovate rapidly enough. Blackberry’s failure to maintain<br />
market share is one widely cited example of <strong>innovation</strong><br />
neglect 59 .<br />
Governments may also neglect <strong>innovation</strong> until crises<br />
arise, leading to wildly fluctuating — and therefore<br />
highly inefficient — patterns of investment. This was<br />
seen, for example, with the rise in public investment in<br />
CASE STUDY<br />
THE HIGH VALUE MANUFACTURING CATAPULT<br />
Dick Elsy (Chief Executive, High Value Manufacturing Catapult)<br />
20<br />
The High Value Manufacturing Catapult (HVMC),<br />
the first “catapult” centre to be opened, just<br />
three years ago, helps commercialise innovative<br />
manufacturing ideas. It combines seven centres of<br />
industrial <strong>innovation</strong> across Britain, bringing together<br />
the following capabilities:<br />
• Provides companies with access to<br />
world-class facilities and skills to help scale<br />
up and prove high-value manufacturing<br />
processes;<br />
• Develops a network of leading<br />
suppliers who contribute to key UK<br />
industry supply chains;<br />
• Brings industry, government and<br />
research together around a shared goal<br />
to make the UK an attractive place to<br />
invest in manufacturing.<br />
The Catapult’s financial model works on the basis of<br />
shared <strong>risk</strong>, with funding coming from three sources:<br />
1. Government core funding;<br />
2. Industry funding;<br />
3. Competitively won collaborative Research and<br />
Development (e.g. Horizon 2020 projects).<br />
Government funding helps to give industry confidence<br />
to take the kind of technological <strong>risk</strong>s from which it<br />
would normally shy away. Industry can access publiclyfunded<br />
manufacturing equipment and skills and has<br />
greater freedom to experiment, develop these radical<br />
concepts and learn from experience.<br />
The uptake of the HVMC has exceeded expectations<br />
and all of the commercial targets agreed at the outset<br />
have been surpassed. Industry funding has reached 45%<br />
with collaborative R&D at 30% and government core<br />
funding representing 25% of the total. The<br />
Catapult is now examining ways to secure this<br />
funding sustainably.<br />
In the past 12 months the HVMC has<br />
attracted:<br />
• 1515 private sector clients;<br />
• 1012 projects;<br />
• 1500+ SME engagements;<br />
• £224m total income;<br />
• £60m of <strong>innovation</strong> income accessed by<br />
SMEs;<br />
• £180m order book with >50% competitively won<br />
collaborative R&D;<br />
• 1250+ staff.<br />
As social scientists, we are interested in why institutions<br />
such as this are successful at fostering <strong>innovation</strong>,<br />
as this can help with future institutional design. The<br />
reasons behind the HVMC’s apparent success are likely<br />
to include the following: it enables <strong>risk</strong>s to be shared<br />
between different organizations; it reduces some of<br />
those <strong>risk</strong>s; and it provides a place where specialised<br />
and complementary skills can come together and grow.