14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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102<br />
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE<br />
PERSPECTIVE<br />
We know more than we think we do. Through research by<br />
social scientists over the past few decades, we have learnt<br />
a great deal about how people gather information on <strong>risk</strong>s<br />
such as flooding, how they respond to it, and how it informs<br />
their actions as individuals and as groups of citizens. But it<br />
is hard to translate these insights — some of which have<br />
now been known for a long time — into practical advice for<br />
individuals and policymakers, mainly because the lessons are<br />
that <strong>risk</strong> is often denied and action is rather less than might<br />
be expected. This is a key challenge facing decision makers.<br />
Denial remains a common reaction from those at <strong>risk</strong><br />
of flooding, even among those with flood experience. The<br />
oft-repeated suggestion is that “It will not happen to me”,<br />
and “I will not be here when the next flood comes”. These<br />
reactions are not driven principally by ignorance, but by an<br />
anxiety about future flooding that people want to minimize 1 .<br />
The language of <strong>risk</strong> is also a barrier: public understanding of<br />
return periods or even annual probabilities is poor.<br />
Whatever the <strong>risk</strong>s, the decisions that individuals and<br />
communities make are influenced by the traditional social<br />
contract with the state: “We pay our taxes and we expect<br />
the government to act”. Communities at <strong>risk</strong> are unlikely<br />
to respond with community <strong>risk</strong>-reducing initiatives and<br />
<strong>innovation</strong>s until after a major event — known as the<br />
“prisoner of experience” phenomenon — rather than in<br />
anticipation of a hazard. Moreover, these responses are often<br />
limited to areas where existing social capital is extensive,<br />
and in relatively affluent and predominantly rural areas<br />
rather than inner cities.<br />
Flood events themselves are often followed by a loss of<br />
trust in those who manage <strong>risk</strong>, as well as dissatisfaction at<br />
the apparent lack of interventions to reduce <strong>risk</strong>, which is<br />
influenced by the perceived unfairness of the governance<br />
process. People have a poor understanding of ‘who is<br />
in charge’, which is unsurprising given the fragmented<br />
governance arrangements related to the different sources<br />
of flooding (rivers; surface water; groundwater; the sea).<br />
They also have a poor grasp of statutory duties and available<br />
resources, and of the time taken to implement interventions.<br />
Small-scale remedies by individuals or community groups are<br />
not trusted to be effective.<br />
Research shows that it is important for decision makers<br />
to present the information on quantifiable <strong>risk</strong>s clearly, and<br />
to put it in context. Uncertainties need to be explained, and<br />
<strong>risk</strong>-reducing measures ‘owned’ by those at <strong>risk</strong> rather than<br />
imposed upon them. Denial needs to be understood, rather<br />
than brushed aside. Trust in the skills of those in authority<br />
— and those with special knowledge and expertise — needs<br />
to be carefully nurtured. Human behaviours need to be<br />
understood and seen in their cultural context — specifically,<br />
political cultures, religious cultures and national cultures<br />
— along with the historic tolerance to <strong>risk</strong> that this brings.<br />
We must also appreciate the types of issues that arise when<br />
science gets deeply embedded in culturally contentious<br />
areas (such as climate change), and how these issues play<br />
out in the various international governance structures for<br />
<strong>risk</strong> and <strong>innovation</strong>.<br />
THE ANALYSTS’ PERSPECTIVE<br />
“All models are wrong — some are useful”<br />
(George Box, 1987)<br />
‘Risk’ is a rich term, including notions of the chance of harm,<br />
consequence and opportunity. In all but the simplest of<br />
settings, judgement or intuition are not enough to establish<br />
a meaningful understanding of present and future flood <strong>risk</strong>,<br />
so decision makers must rely upon models.<br />
Flood <strong>risk</strong> management resources are limited and, even<br />
if we wanted to, it is not possible to reduce all flood <strong>risk</strong>s<br />
for all people to a common level 2 . Any biases within the<br />
modelling approach that leads to an over- or under-estimate<br />
of <strong>risk</strong> therefore have the potential to misdirect these<br />
limited resources. But in recent years, flood <strong>risk</strong> analysts<br />
have made significant progress in developing models to<br />
support better design, planning and emergency response<br />
decisions. This has involved reducing modelling bias and<br />
incompleteness. But in doing so, a number of significant<br />
issues and challenges associated with understanding <strong>risk</strong> and<br />
<strong>managing</strong> it appropriately continue to be exposed 3 .<br />
The ‘whole system’ challenge<br />
The flood <strong>risk</strong> system consists of all of the important sources<br />
of flooding, all of the potential receptors that may be affected<br />
(either directly or indirectly), and the performance of the<br />
intervening system of physical pathways (the land surfaces,<br />
channels, beaches and engineered channels, defences,<br />
barriers and pumps). It also includes the interactions with<br />
society (individuals; emergency response teams; businesses<br />
and so on) and the broader interaction with physical,<br />
ecological and human systems. Traditional modelling<br />
approaches have typically focused on individual components<br />
of this ‘whole system’, and thereafter we have tended to<br />
manage the analyzed <strong>risk</strong>s and not the complex reality.<br />
Whole system thinking provides a significant challenge<br />
to the analyst. The chance of harm is not, as it is often<br />
mistakenly supposed, equivalent to the chance that a<br />
particular storm event occurs. Equally, the consequence<br />
of a flood is not simply the direct material damage, but<br />
reflects the inherent susceptibility of a receptor to a flood,<br />
its ability to recover unaided in a timely manner, and the<br />
value society places on the harm incurred. Whole system<br />
modelling approaches are in their infancy but are now, at<br />
least, recognized as a worthwhile endeavour.<br />
The fallacy of reductionism and the truth of<br />
uncertainty<br />
The behaviour of flood <strong>risk</strong> systems is intrinsically stochastic