14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
14-1190b-innovation-managing-risk-evidence
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equity of <strong>risk</strong> distribution, the perceived unnaturalness of<br />
the hazard, observability of the <strong>risk</strong> and so on. Box 1 shows<br />
some of the characteristics which make <strong>risk</strong>s more or less<br />
acceptable to people. As a result, a new and unfamiliar <strong>risk</strong><br />
that people feel that they have little control over, as in the<br />
driverless train in the Docklands Light Railway case study,<br />
may require special actions and communications to be in<br />
place to reassure people of safety measures. Subsequent<br />
to this early work, we also know that the way people think<br />
about and judge <strong>risk</strong>s is influenced by the way they respond<br />
to the affective resonances and feelings that it evokes, and<br />
analytic information 6, 7 .<br />
While it is tempting to view affect, or emotion, as an<br />
irrational process that only afflicts people who differ in<br />
view from us, we also know that rational decision-making<br />
requires elements of both analysis and affect. For example,<br />
without emotional commitment in decision-making we<br />
would not remain committed to important choices 8 . Benefits<br />
also matter to people, as <strong>risk</strong> is more acceptable if it holds<br />
perceived benefits that are equitably distributed, as does<br />
trust in <strong>risk</strong> managers and institutions, an issue to which we<br />
return below.<br />
The early psychometric studies provided a model for an<br />
extensive research programme and literature 3, 5, 9 . However,<br />
while the basic approach of psychometric <strong>risk</strong> perceptions<br />
research provided extensive empirical descriptions of the<br />
psychology of <strong>risk</strong> perceptions, it did not initially yield<br />
substantive theoretical progress towards explaining those<br />
beliefs, or people’s behaviour in the face of <strong>risk</strong>s.<br />
Values, Culture and the Risk Society<br />
Social and cultural factors are important to <strong>risk</strong> perception<br />
because the perceiver of <strong>risk</strong> is rarely an isolated individual,<br />
but a ‘social being’ defined through a range of relationships<br />
with others 10 , raising the question of how societal values<br />
shape <strong>risk</strong> perceptions. The best known socio-cultural<br />
approach to <strong>risk</strong>, that of Douglas and Wildavsky 11 , develops<br />
the worldview idea in conceptual terms, positing that<br />
human attitudes towards <strong>risk</strong> and danger vary systematically<br />
according to four cultural biases: individualist, fatalist,<br />
hierarchist and egalitarian.<br />
These biases are held to reflect modes of social<br />
organization, thought and value, all of which serve the<br />
Contemporary<br />
investigations of energy<br />
issues and climate<br />
change show how deeper<br />
values are bound up with<br />
our <strong>risk</strong> perceptions.<br />
US conservatives were<br />
more favourable towards<br />
environmental messages<br />
when these focused<br />
on pollution, and the<br />
‘purity’ of the natural<br />
environment, rather than<br />
arguments about a moral<br />
responsibility to avoid<br />
harm.<br />
function of defending individuals’ favoured institutional<br />
arrangements and ways of life, and in particular who to<br />
blame when those arrangements become threatened from<br />
outside 12 . Risk perception becomes central to the process<br />
of institutional defence, with cultural biases orienting<br />
people’s selection of which dangers to accept or to avoid,<br />
the fairness of distribution of <strong>risk</strong>s across society, and<br />
who to blame when things do go wrong. Cultural theory<br />
has also been valuable in stressing the neglect, within the<br />
early psychometric studies, of a concern for the political<br />
dimensions of <strong>risk</strong>, although it suffers from the fact that its<br />
categories of worldview are top-down in nature, and from<br />
difficulties in measurement 13 .<br />
More recent work on ‘cultural cognition’, however,<br />
draws on this thinking to demonstrate why certain <strong>risk</strong><br />
issues (handguns, abortion) have become deeply polarized<br />
across US society <strong>14</strong> . Contemporary investigations of energy<br />
issues 15,16 , and climate change 17 also show how deeper values<br />
are bound up with our <strong>risk</strong> perceptions. We know that<br />
individuals with political affiliations to right-leaning political<br />
parties tend to identify with less egalitarian and more<br />
individualistic values, and as a result are more likely to be<br />
sceptical about the claims of climate change scientists and<br />
<strong>risk</strong>s 18 . However, this work also suggests how some values<br />
that are widely endorsed can be incorporated as important<br />
components of narratives about <strong>risk</strong> (see case study on<br />
climate change narratives). For example, recent research<br />
with US conservatives found that they were more favourable<br />
towards environmental messages when these focused on<br />
pollution, and the ‘purity’ of the natural environment, rather<br />
than the more conventional set of arguments about a moral<br />
responsibility to avoid harm 19 .<br />
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