Space Link Extension - Service Management - CCSDS

DRAFT RECOMMENDED STANDARD FOR SPACE LINK EXTENSION SERVICE MANAGEMENT
2.4.2.2 Data Privacy (also known as Confidentiality)
Encryption of a message prevents anyone but the intended receiver from being able to read
the message.
2.4.2.3 Data Integrity
Encryption of a message prevents a third party from tampering with the content of a message
in a way that would be undetected by the receiver.
2.4.2.4 Authentication
Signature authentication of a message prevents a third party from masquerading as another
(legitimate) correspondent. Signature authentication is provided by the referenced XML
security standards.
2.4.2.5 Access Control
Access control is inherent in all SLE-SM services, regardless of the concrete transfer syntax
used. The ability to add, update, or view service management information for a given
spaceflight mission is restricted to a specified list of sleSmCreatorNames that are
specified in the Service Agreement for that mission. Every SLE-SM message set contains the
sleSmCreatorName of the sender of the message set, and the sleSmCreatorName is
authenticated by the receiver of the message before it is accepted.
In addition, each individual Service Package, Space Link Session Profile, SLS Transfer
Service Profile, Retrieval Transfer Service Profile, Event Profile, and Trajectory Prediction
has associated with it the sleSmCreatorName of the UM entity that is authorized to
subsequently replace or delete that information entity.
2.4.2.6 Availability of Resources
The SLE-SM services are provided via communication networks that have some limit to the
resources available to support those SLE-SM services. If these resources can be diverted
from their support of the SLE-SM services (in what is commonly known as ‘denial of
service’) then the performance of the SLE-SM services may be curtailed or inhibited.
This SLE-SM Recommended Standard does not define explicit capabilities to prevent denial
of service. Resource availability is expected to be ensured by appropriate capabilities in the
underlying communication service. The specific capabilities will be dependent upon the
technologies used in the underlying communication service and the security environment in
which the UM and CM operate.
CCSDS 910.11-R-2 Page 2-15 March 2008