Space Link Extension - Service Management - CCSDS

DRAFT RECOMMENDED STANDARD FOR SPACE LINK EXTENSION SERVICE MANAGEMENT
2.4.2.7 Auditing
This SLE-SM Recommended Standard does not define explicit security auditing
requirements or capabilities. Security auditing, if required, is expected to be negotiated and
implemented bilaterally between the spaceflight mission and the service provider.
2.4.3 POTENTIAL THREATS AND ATTACK SCENARIOS
The SLE-SM services do not carry communications that originate or terminate at the
spacecraft, so compromise of the SLE-SM services does not allow an attacker to directly
attack the spacecraft. Rather, the threat is one of denial of service.
Without the appropriate security measures, attackers may masquerade as legitimate users to:
a) delete in-place configuration profiles or Trajectory Predictions that the legitimate
users expect to be in place when they attempt to create Service Packages that
reference those entities;
b) intercept, modify, and reissue a CreateServicePackageInvocation such
that the resulting invocation is unschedulable or creates a Service Package that is
unusable by the MDOS;
c) replace or delete existing Service Packages;
d) cause the creation of bogus Service Packages that tie up resources that are needed by
spaceflight missions;
e) cause switches to alternate scenarios that are not consistent with reality, causing loss
of space link sessions (e.g., switching to a launch slip scenario when the launch
actually occurs on time).
2.4.4 CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPLYING SECURITY
The consequence of not applying security to the SLE-SM services is possible denial of
service. Denial of service can result in degraded mission performance, increased operations
costs, and even loss of mission if service is denied during a critical mission phase.
CCSDS 910.11-R-2 Page 2-16 March 2008