Growing the Wealth of the Poor - World Resources Institute

W O R L D R E S O U R C E S 2 0 0 8154Role of Government: From Policemen to AlliesOne of the biggest hurdles to widespread adoption of FMNRwas the state ownership of Niger’s trees. Villagers were wellaware of the law because the oppressive Forestry Service vigorouslyenforced it for over 20 years, well into the 1980s, makingfarmers hesitant to manage trees. However, de facto shifts in theforest and land tenure system began in the late 1980s as part ofthe government’s transition to democracy (USAID et al.2002:42; Wentling 2008a).These de facto shifts were driven by a confluence of forces.Macro issues included the fallout from the 1984 drought andNiger’s 1987 transition to a democratic government. There werealso a range of smaller efforts taking place simultaneously thathad an impact on the thinking of the government. One of themost important of these was a USAID project that partneredNiger’s Forest Service with rural residents to manage a formerly“off-limits” national park using FMNR and soil and waterconservation techniques.The Forest and Land Use Planning project convinced theForest Service that such practices were effective and couldactually create revenue for the state, as the partnership was basedaround a sustainable wood harvesting cooperative that dividedrevenues between the Forest Service and local people (Gallegoset al. 1987:51–52). MIDP and CARE projects were also helpingthe government realize the goals of its 1985 Plan to CombatDesertification, thereby solidifying the effectiveness of FMNRand these localized conservation techniques in the minds ofgovernment officials (Gallegos et al. 1987:24).In 1987, the transitional government created a PermanentRural Code Secretariat to begin the process of revising the RuralCode, a body of law that applied to much of Niger and thatincluded the provision establishing government ownership oftrees. MIDP, USAID, and others worked with the new Inter-Ministerial Committee on Natural Resources, charged by thegovernment to develop a new Code (Gallegos et al. 1987:25).The organizations were largely successful in their efforts,though formal legal changes took longer than hoped due togovernment instability. The Code that was signed in 1993 recognizedboth customary and formal land use rights and laid thegroundwork for transferring tree ownership to property owners(McGahuey 2008). Legislation to implement the new code at thevillage level was passed in 1998 and came into force in 2004(Wentling 2008a). For many farmers, having this sense ofsecurity about managing trees without fear of legal repercussionstipped the balance of self-interest in favor of embracingFMNR’s simple, cheap, and effective practices.Prompted and assisted by foreign donors, the new governmentdid not limit its reforms to the Rural Code. In pursuit ofeconomic development and improved management of thecountry’s beleaguered natural resources, it also overhauled thecountry’s Forest Code, decentralization laws, Forest Service, andforest fiscal policy (USAID et al. 2002:42). The collective impactwas to create an economic and social environment in whichsustainable land management practices, such as FMNR and soiland water conservation, could and did explode across thecountry. “Under the old system, the spontaneous spread ofFMNR would not have likely occurred,” says Mike McGahuey.“FMNR demonstrated that the most effective role of governmentwas to reduce barriers and strengthen farmers’ incentivesto engage in and benefit from environmentally and sociallysustainable agricultural practices” (McGahuey 2008).Role of Intermediaries: Agents of ChangeIn an effective partnership, international donors and NGOs havehad a twofold impact on the spread of Niger’s tree regenerationmovement: promoting new land management practices amongNiger’s farmers and facilitating the government reforms thatenabled community experiments to reach national scale.The U.S. and German governments and the World Bankacted as significant catalysts by providing intellectual input,funding, land management expertise, and pressure for policyreform. In the 1980s USAID, GTZ, the French and Dutchgovernments, IFAD, and the World Bank helped provide theeconomic rationale for farmer-led tree regeneration by fundingresearch on the superior benefits of native vegetation, includingpotential markets for forest products (Winterbottom 2008).While supporting soil conservation and tree managementprograms, these donors also engaged the government of Niger ina policy dialogue on sustainable natural resource management,stressing the need for community rights, laws providing secureresource tenure, and reform of both the forestry code and the