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Growing the Wealth of the Poor - World Resources Institute

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In <strong>the</strong> 1970s and 1980s, efforts to make tenure more securein Africa, Asia, and Latin America focused on large-scale landtitlingprograms, emphasizing formal land registration andindividual title deeds backed by detailed surveys <strong>of</strong> propertyboundaries (cadastral surveys). This approach brought somesuccess in Latin America and Asia. In Nicaragua, Ecuador, andVenezuela, research shows that registration <strong>of</strong> land has broughthigher agricultural investment and land values, while Thailand’stitling program has increased productivity and investment ontitled farm land (Cotula et al. 2006:20; van den Brink et al.2006:19–20; Feder 2002: 15, 18; Deininger 2003:42–51).In general, however, traditional titling efforts have notproved to be an effective and cost-efficient approach, particularlyin Africa. They tend to be too expensive, time-consuming, andbureaucratically complex and <strong>the</strong>refore not very accessible to <strong>the</strong>poor. In 1985, Ghana enacted a registration law intended to helpformalize all interests in land, whe<strong>the</strong>r under customary tenure or<strong>the</strong> nation’s common law tenure. But <strong>the</strong> country’s registry hasnot been able to process applications quickly enough and a largebacklog remains. In addition, poor quality control in <strong>the</strong> registrationprocess led to 30,000 disputed titles as <strong>of</strong> 2000 (Cotula et al.2006: 20–22; Toulmin 2005:46; van den Brink et al. 2006:12–13).Titling also brings with it o<strong>the</strong>r challenges and unintendedconsequences. Experience shows that local elites <strong>of</strong>ten try to takeadvantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> titling process to grab land or to influence <strong>the</strong>registration process in <strong>the</strong>ir favor, such as by registering commonlands in <strong>the</strong>ir own name. Titling may also work against marginalizedgroups, such as widows or <strong>the</strong> poor, who may not have <strong>the</strong>time, money, or technical understanding to protect <strong>the</strong>ir interestsagainst those with more influence or contacts. Titling may evenincrease land conflicts—at least in <strong>the</strong> short term—as peoplewith latent disputes realize that registration will be a decisive stepin deciding who holds property rights over a given piece <strong>of</strong> landor resource (Cotula et al. 2006:20).Using Local InstitutionsAs a result, <strong>the</strong> thinking on how best to improve tenure security hasnow shifted away from wholesale replacement <strong>of</strong> customary tenurewith formal titles. The current consensus is that a broader approachis necessary that builds on local tenure practices and uses local institutionsto help execute simpler forms <strong>of</strong> land and resource registrationopen to a broader range <strong>of</strong> rural families. Such registration can bemuch lower-cost and can <strong>of</strong>fer an intermediate level <strong>of</strong> formalizationthat provides a measurable increase in security (Cotula et al. 2006:21–22; van den Brink et al. 2006:14). In Niger, for example, <strong>the</strong>government has instituted a community-based system for registeringlocal land rights in <strong>the</strong> Mirriah region by creating Village LandCommissions. The five-person committees publicize <strong>the</strong> requests <strong>the</strong>yreceive for land registration and, if a request is not contested, <strong>the</strong>yrecord it in <strong>the</strong> village land register (Toulmin 2005:48).Ano<strong>the</strong>r key to increasing tenure security is rectifying nationaltenure laws so that <strong>the</strong>y recognize local customary land rights.Countries such as Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Niger, andNamibia have all made efforts to protect such customary tenure inB U I L D I N G O W N E R S H I P, C A P A C I T Y , A N D C O N N E C T I O Nlaw and <strong>of</strong>ten to recognize it through various forms <strong>of</strong> registration.On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, under Mozambique’s 1997 land law, customaryuse rights are protected whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y have been registered ornot. The law also mandates that communities be consulted wheninvestment projects are proposed within <strong>the</strong>ir jurisdiction and begiven <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> first refusal (Cotula et al. 2006:21; IIED 2006:7).One potential problem with blanket recognition <strong>of</strong> customarytenure is that it may formalize existing inequalities in customarytenure arrangements, which <strong>of</strong>ten concentrate land rights inauthorities such as tribal chiefs (Ribot 2008).Rights for <strong>the</strong> LandlessA comprehensive approach to increasing tenure security must alsoserve those who don’t own land. Land leasing arrangements, forexample, are an important form <strong>of</strong> land access for many ruralfamilies. Tenure experts point out that full, titled ownership is notalways required to give secure access to land and resources. Longertermlease or tenant arrangements can also provide security andflexibility at much lower cost than land purchases, making <strong>the</strong>m agood entry point for many poor families to increase <strong>the</strong>ir land andresource access. Sometimes, NGOs can play a useful intermediaryrole in helping <strong>the</strong> poor negotiate land leases. In <strong>the</strong> Indian state <strong>of</strong>Andhra Pradesh, an NGO called <strong>the</strong> Deccan Development Societyhas helped lower-caste women lease underutilized private land ona tenancy basis (Cotula et al. 2006:25).Finally, any approach to more secure tenure must include <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> more effective systems to resolve land disputes.Often, several different courts and land dispute tribunals—somepart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national legal system and some operating undercustomary law—operate in <strong>the</strong> same jurisdiction without coordination.Those with conflicts <strong>of</strong>ten go “forum shopping,” lookingfor <strong>the</strong> venue where <strong>the</strong>y feel <strong>the</strong>y will get <strong>the</strong> most favorableruling. The result is that many land disputes are never fullyresolved in a manner that is binding or accepted by all parties. Afunctional dispute resolution system must include both customaryand statutory mechanisms within a single framework, with <strong>the</strong>connection between <strong>the</strong> two clearly established (von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Cotula et al. 2006:23).Forests: Leading Tenure ProgressHow quickly such approaches can be applied to bring measurableincreases in resource tenure security is uncertain. But it is clear thatfundamental changes in <strong>the</strong> tenure landscape are already underway, particularly with respect to state-owned resources such asforests. Forest tenure has changed substantially in <strong>the</strong> last fewdecades, with <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> forest administered by communitiesdoubling in <strong>the</strong> past 15 years alone to 25 percent <strong>of</strong> all developingcountryforests (White et al. 2007:15) New legislation and reformsnow taking place suggest that this increase may continue, withsome experts predicting <strong>the</strong> percentage <strong>of</strong> community forests maydouble again by 2020. For instance, in 2006, <strong>the</strong> Indian parliamentpassed legislation recognizing <strong>the</strong> land and use rights <strong>of</strong>indigenous tribes and o<strong>the</strong>r traditional forest dwellers. Meanwhile,<strong>the</strong> Indonesian government indicated it would allocate 60 percentOWNERSHIP53

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