Growing the Wealth of the Poor - World Resources Institute

OWNERSHIP62W O R L D R E S O U R C E S 2 0 0 8form of simply adhering to a new ecosystem management regimethat calls for reducing harvest levels—a definite sacrifice for poorfamilies whose dependence on the resource may be high. Forexample, participants in Bangladesh’s MACH program (Managementof Aquatic Ecosystems through Community Husbandry),which sought to increase fish harvests for lakeside communities,had to forgo fishing in established sanctuaries, stop using certainfishing gear such as mesh nets, and curtail certain types ofhunting and gathering. (See Chapter 3: Fisheries for the Future:Restoring Wetland Livelihoods in Bangladesh.) The advantageof using nonmonetary forms of commitment is that they tend toincrease actual involvement in the endeavor and create a sharedsense of effort and mutual sacrifice that furthers the groupdynamic and increases the sustainability of the project.Inspiring Collective ActionAt the heart of joint management of natural resources is “collectiveaction” —the willingness to work collaboratively in the pursuitof a common goal. This is what occurs when people decide that itis in their best interest to co-manage a community forest or fisheryor work together to insure that an irrigation system operatesproperly. Most ecosystem-based enterprises depend for theirsuccess on collective action because they make use of commonpool resources, where many users have access to the resource.Collective action is essential to keep the resource from overexploitationand to make sure benefits are fairly apportioned. Thiskind of collaboration is nothing new—groups have been engagingin collective resource management for millennia. However, manyyears of research have confirmed that some conditions are morefavorable for inspiring and maintaining collective action thanothers (Ostrom 1990:88–102; Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregorio2004:1; Ostrom 2004:1–2; Agrawal 2001:1659).Demand is the starting point for collective action. Anotherkey condition is that the community or group must have theauthority to manage the resource. They must have the autonomyto create and enforce rules—whether formal or informal—forresource use. Without this ability to apply their rules and makethem stick, the rationale for joint action quickly diminishes (Brunsand Bruns 2004:1). (See Figure 3.)The will and ability to enforce rules is paramount. Groupsneed the authority to set boundaries and control access to theresource and the means to monitor the resource for infractions.The rules themselves must have some force behind them, whetherit is the threat of punishment, rewards for cooperative behavior, orthe threat of alienation from the group. To a certain extent, thedetails of the rules the group adopts matter less to the success ofthe collective action than how well these rules are monitored andenforced (Bruns and Bruns 2004:1; Gibson et al. 2005:279–282;Barrett et al. 2005:195).Not surprisingly, social capital is a fundamental building blockof effective collective action. When people in a group are linked bysocial bonds and share norms and social expectations they aremore likely to successfully manage a resource together and succeedFIGURE 3 INFLUENCE OF COMMUNITY RULESON THE SUCCESS OF FOREST MANAGEMENT(CFM) IN 69 COMMUNITIESSuccess rate of CFM100%80%60%40%20%70%*of 57communitiesevaluated0%Rules and RegulationsPresentSource: Pagdee et al 2006:450%*of 12communitiesevaluatedRules and RegulationsAbsentat an ecosystem-based enterprise. The social capital of the groupgreatly influences how effective it is in making and followingresource management rules. In the words of one researcher: “Trustlubricates cooperation” (Pretty and Ward 2001:210). It reduces the“transaction costs” of working together, saving time, worry, andmoney. Where social bonds are strong, the threat of social sanctionsalone is an effective means of rule enforcement (Pretty and Ward2001:210–217; Uphoff 1999:221–231).Experience working together as a group in the past alsocontributes to success. Those who already have some experienceof the group dynamic are more likely to put their faith in newenterprises that require collective action. It helps, too, if somemembers of the group have previous experience with thebenefits of a particular kind of collective action. This can act asa strong motivator for continued participation in the groupendeavor and a source of inspiration for other group members.In a study of Haitian peasant groups who undertook jointwatershed management, those groups with at least somemembers who had experience adopting soil conservationmeasures in the past were most likely to continue workingtogether (White and Runge 1995:1690–1692). In Mozambique,the fishers of the Inhassoro community rapidly adopted afisheries co-management arrangement offered by the state in1995 because years earlier they had informally adopted closedfishing seasons and other management practices on their own,and they knew the advantages and challenges of these practices.They were primed for the opportunity when it came (Chuenpagdeeand Jentoft 2007:661).The proven value of experience, trust, and knowledge ofbenefits to the success of collective action emphasizes the need tobring these elements into play early when forming nature-basedenterprises. Where these elements have not been previouslydeveloped in the group, there is a pressing need to employcommunication, demonstration, knowledge sharing, and trustbuildingprocesses—the motivators behind demand—to fill thevoid. Building the social capacity of the group to work together