Growing the Wealth of the Poor - World Resources Institute

170for many nature-based enterprises. The state has a clear role indefining, encouraging, and enforcing sustainable naturalresource management. Based on its synoptic view of thenation’s ecosystems, the state must make sure that local resourceexploitation patterns are compatible with the national vision forresource management and, when summed together, do notdegrade the resource base. However, governments have atendency toward heavy-handed regulation of communitygroups who manage natural resources. This often manifests asstrict prescriptions for “best practices” that communities arerequired to follow or complex management plans that they mustformulate before being granted the necessary permits to harvestor carry out management activities. In many cases theseprescriptions are unnecessarily complex, do not respect localinstitutions or capacities, and impose a severe financial burden(Ribot 2004:54–59; Molnar et al. 2007:64–70). Thus, regulationsthat may be appropriate for industrial-scale enterprisesmanaging large tracts of forest or significant fishing fleets can beoverkill for small community-based enterprises, resulting in acompetitive disadvantage.Under Cameroon’s 1994 Forestry Law, for example, therequirements for establishing a community forest include creatinga management committee with a constitution, mapping theforest areas at issue and comparing them to the government’soverall forest plan, and submitting a forest management plan.These steps have proved too complex and expensive for mostcommunities (Ribot 2004:55). Similar planning and permitobstacles plague forest users in many other countries, includingIndia, Nepal, Tanzania, Bolivia, Guatemala, Senegal, and thePhilippines. In Guatemala’s community forest concessions in thePetén region, the overlapping inspection requirements of donors,international certifiers (the Forest Stewardship Council), andgovernment agencies burdened fledgling enterprises with highcosts and hindered their transition to financial independence. In2007, a survey of community forestry enterprises worldwidefound that artificial and overdemanding rules for managementplans and other required permits and procedures—and the highcosts associated with them—were major obstacles to the successof community-based businesses (Molnar et al. 2007:66–70).Overzealous government oversight and micromanagementof community enterprises amounts to resistance to true devolutionof resource rights to local communities. It often stems fromfear by government bureaucrats that rural communities lack thecapacity—and therefore cannot be trusted—to manage resourcesresponsibly and efficiently. This lack of “capacity” is used as anexcuse to delay granting the necessary government permission,often without offering any avenue or resources for gaining therequired capacities or meeting the required standards. The netresult is that the government retains its accustomed role at thecenter of resource management (Ribot 2004:59–65).An alternative to the over-regulation of community-basednatural resource enterprises would be to adopt a “minimumstandards” approach. The national government would establisha minimum set of rules or standards that communitymembers must follow in their management but would grantcommunities flexibility in how they meet this standard. Forinstance, environmental standards could be set for how muchof a forest can be cut in a single year, what rare or endangeredspecies are not to be harvested, or what seasons are off-limitsfor fishing in order to encourage spawning and stock replenishment.On the other hand, all activities not specified in theenvironmental rules or not at odds with the environmentalstandard would be allowed without the need for a permit ormanagement plan. This would reverse the current regulatorystructure in which only activities specified in the managementplan are allowed (Ribot 2004:56–59).Minimum environmental standards or targets couldprovide the flexibility that local groups need to adapt andinnovate in their management without compromising sustainability.Of course, this would only be possible if reasonablesanctions were in place for breaching the standards, such asfines or temporary loss of harvest rights. As in any regulatoryscheme, credible monitoring and enforcement would be crucial.Simplicity and clarity of the standards and the consequences offailure to meet them would also be a key factor in the success ofthis approach (Ribot 2004:56–59).In addition to their substantial regulatory burden, smallnature-based enterprises also commonly suffer from inappro-