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Wireless Future - Telenor

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The link key is used for authentication. This is<br />

a challenge-response scheme where the verifier<br />

sends a 128 bit challenge to which the claimant<br />

responds with a 32 bit number that is a hash<br />

function of the challenge and the link key.<br />

The verifier checks that the received claimant<br />

response is the correct one by computing what<br />

the true value is. All this is done automatically,<br />

and mutual authentication is possible by performing<br />

one challenge-response procedure in<br />

each direction. Once pairing has been done, the<br />

user(s) need not actively do anything on subsequent<br />

connections between the devices, since the<br />

authentication protocol will recall the link key<br />

from memory.<br />

If link security is requested, both devices generate<br />

an encryption key after the identities of the<br />

units have been confirmed through the authentication<br />

procedure. This key (based on the link<br />

key, a device address, and a random number) is<br />

used for initialising the encryption hardware.<br />

The ciphering algorithm is a stream cipher<br />

sequence that is added bitwise modulo 2 to the<br />

data payload that is sent over air. To accommodate<br />

for different export regulations with respect<br />

to hardware containing encryption algorithms,<br />

the effective length of the encryption key can be<br />

restricted in hardware (1 to 16 bytes). Therefore,<br />

Bluetooth devices that want to set up a secure<br />

link need to negotiate what length to use before<br />

the keys are created. Figure 6 depicts the sequence<br />

of pairing, link key generation, and<br />

encryption key generation.<br />

The security means defined in the Bluetooth<br />

specification relates only to the link. There is<br />

no end-to-end protocols defined. Data sent to<br />

a Bluetooth module is considered as plain-text<br />

strings, and delivered in the same format at the<br />

receiver module’s host interface. The idea is<br />

only to protect the air interface from eavesdropping.<br />

Moreover, the identification process is<br />

based on device authentication, not message<br />

authentication. The receiver can be quite sure<br />

from which radio a particular message comes,<br />

but it cannot know which application (or user)<br />

that sent the message.<br />

More details on security issues can be found in<br />

[5].<br />

4 <strong>Future</strong> Evolution<br />

The Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) has<br />

formed working groups in different areas. The<br />

purpose of these is to increase the usability of<br />

the Bluetooth system by identifying new usage<br />

scenarios and create profiles for them. In some<br />

cases, the current specification may have certain<br />

characteristics that prevent or make implementation<br />

more difficult than desirable. To handle<br />

that, the specification will be revised regularly.<br />

Telektronikk 1.2001<br />

PIN<br />

E22<br />

LINK KEY<br />

E3<br />

ENCRYPTION KEY<br />

First time connections<br />

Authentication<br />

EN_RAND<br />

Encryption<br />

The Bluetooth version 1.1 (successor of 1.0B)<br />

will be released relatively soon (early 2001).<br />

Below we will refer to versions 1.1, 1.2, ... as<br />

Bluetooth 1.x.<br />

4.1 Improving the Current<br />

Specification<br />

One of the most common wishes when it comes<br />

to improving the current specification, is to make<br />

connection set-up time faster. One scenario<br />

where this is desirable is walk-by toll gates, for<br />

instance at subway entrances. To guarantee that a<br />

pedestrian is registered, the Bluetooth link must<br />

be set up within 1–2 seconds at most. In the current<br />

version, the worst case for inquiry and paging<br />

is closer to 10 seconds. Even though this<br />

worst case truly is a rather unlikely value, for<br />

some applications it is not acceptable that there is<br />

a slight possibility for this to happen.<br />

For multimedia services, it is easy to envision<br />

cases where both streaming data and conventional<br />

data are transferred between nodes. Mixing<br />

best effort and isochronous traffic is difficult<br />

within the current specification since no prioritisation<br />

functionality for messages controlled by<br />

the user exists. Because transmit queues cannot<br />

be pre-empted or scheduled, it is not possible to<br />

guarantee access to the channel at a certain time<br />

instant given that a retransmission sequence is<br />

ongoing. In the future, different means for controlling<br />

meaningful Quality of Service (QoS)<br />

levels are likely to be added to the specification.<br />

The baseband specification is filled with hooks<br />

related to inter-piconet communication. However,<br />

to guarantee interoperability it is necessary<br />

to specify how to use these also on higher protocol<br />

layers. It is likely that profiles for this will<br />

be created. To make more advanced ad-hoc net-<br />

PIN<br />

E22<br />

LINK KEY<br />

E3<br />

ENCRYPTION KEY<br />

Figure 6 Order of key<br />

generation steps (top-tobottom)<br />

for Bluetooth devices<br />

71

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