COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

Godfrey’s main concern was most likely security, once again showing the Britishdistrust of the U.S. on this issue. While information was being exchanged onthe mechanics of decrypting Japanese communications and while the U.S. wasreceiving sanitized intelligence derived from ULTRA at this stage, raw intelligencefrom that source was still closely held by the British. 338 McCollum wouldfortuitously encounter an old friend after his meeting with Godfrey, one who hadaccess to the highest levels of the Admiralty. The next day McCollum was calledin to see the First Sea Lord, ADM Sir Dudley Pound, who told him that Godfreyhad been instructed to hold nothing back from him. After this, McCollum wasgiven full access to the OIC and was able to see how proficient the British were atusing all-source intelligence fusion to maintain the tactical picture in the Atlanticand engage in predictive analysis of U-boat operations. McCollum would bringthis valuable information back to the U.S. Navy and would use it to set up the firstpilot program that would later become the Fleet Intelligence Center, for thePacific Fleet in Hawaii. 339Although the British had desired a system of collaborative OPINTEL centerson both sides of the Atlantic almost from the inception of the OIC, it was nevera real possibility given the fundamentally different ways each navy viewedintelligence and, consequently, had organized their intelligence services to meetthose views. Eventually the U.S. Fleet commanders saw a need for an OPIN-TEL capability and, rather than going to ONI for this service, they chose to createtheir own intelligence fusion centers within their staff organizations. 340Although initially far more limited in capability than the British OIC, theseFleet Intelligence Centers would, due to the pressure of war, eventually grow torival their British counterpart.338 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 86-87; Aldrich, 81.339 McCollum Reminiscences, 330-331, 345-346, 353.340 Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 112-113; Packard, 21692