COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

While the boom defense-arresting gear deal showed the limits of theexchanges between the two navies on the eve of the war, the situation wouldbegin to change substantially once the war began. For example, a week after thewar began, the British Naval Attaché, CAPT Curzon-Howe, requested detailsfrom the U.S. on its HF/DF network, stating the British were prepared toexchange full details of their network in exchange. 158 Anderson agreed to thisexchange, although he made it clear that the U.S. was not prepared to exchangethe intelligence derived from this source to the British, but rather merely thestructure of the network. 159British Attitudes on Intelligence ExchangeSeptember 1939 to May 1940Despite the qualified success of the boom defense-arresting gear deal, thecommencement of the war in September 1939 would make the sharing of intelligencemore difficult. As Patrick Beesly has noted, “[f]or the first six months ofthe war both sides were anxious to receive but loath to give” information to theother side. 160 With respect to the British, many authors have cited security concernsas the main reason for their reluctance to share intelligence. 161 The archivaldata clearly show that security was the main British concern and that it had a significantimpact on intelligence cooperation during the first months of the war.When reflecting on this period, CAPT Kirk remembered that obtaining informationon the new German magnetic mine was a primary intelligence objective ofhis office. The British were reluctant to tell the U.S. anything about the mine duringthe first month of the war “because they didn’t think our security in Washingtonwas good enough to prevent the Germans finding out what they knew.” 162Kirk’s letters to his superiors during this period also reflect his growing frustrationwith the British. In January of 1940, he and his men had considerable difficultygetting anything from the Admiralty and they were told, in confidence, thatporous U.S. security was the reason. When Kirk confronted Godfrey with thisproblem, he was shown an article in the Army & Navy Register that clearly indicatedmonies allocated for harbor defenses were to purchase netting and other158L. Curzon-Howe, CAPT, Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S.Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 8 September 1939, DNI Correspondence.159 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Captain L. Curzon-Howe,M.V.O., Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, 25 September 1939, DNI Correspondence. Thefirst exchange occurred in the spring of 1940 when two U.S. Navy personnel visited the British HF/DF site at Bermuda where they observed “British operations, net procedures, and the employmentof fixed antenna equipment.” For additional information see Bray, xviii.160 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 174.161 Zimmerman, 47-48; Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 54.162 Kirk Reminiscences, 143.47