COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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accelerating British capabilities, however, Kirk did fall prey to technical chauvinism.While believing the British were probably farther along than the Americansin anti-submarine warfare and harbor defenses, he also believed that the U.S. was“pretty far ahead of [the British] in certain things [like]...air operations” and antiairdefenses. 173 Technical chauvinism would play a major role in U.S. resistanceto engage in technical exchanges with the British, as many naval officers felt theU.S. was on the cutting edge of technology in all fields and had little to gain fromsharing their superior advances with the British.Initial Steps Toward Improved Cooperation— The Kirk-Godfrey RelationshipBridging the Divide—British Cultivation of the U.S. Naval AttachéGodfrey, along with others in British intelligence, firmly believed it was in thebest interests of the British to provide information to the Americans without theexpectation of getting any short-term benefits from the exchange. Although a relativelylow-level figure in the policy realm, as DNI Godfrey had the ear of theRoyal Navy’s leadership and, through them, to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlainand Churchill. His admirers have credited him with having a key role in thedevelopment of the U.S.-UK alliance, saying that Godfrey saw from the outset“that the British goal must be to draw the Americans closer and closer and thatthis could best be achieved by providing them with as much information as possible.”174 At the start of the war, Godfrey’s main conduit for his attempt to influenceU.S. policy was the U.S. naval attaché, Kirk. Most authors have concluded thatGodfrey cultivated Kirk, providing him what information he could to earn U.S.goodwill and that he, personally, did not care about the lack of equitable informationexchange. 175 For Godfrey, the long-term benefit was the addition of U.S.strength to the British cause.The observation that Godfrey cultivated Kirk leaves the misimpression thatKirk’s advocacy for greater information exchange with the British was basedentirely on Godfrey’s influence. However, while Godfrey’s willingness to provide173Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 3-4. Presumably, Kirk’s reference to America’sadvanced anti-air defense capabilities was a reference to the U.S.’s nascent radar capability, anarea where the British were actually far ahead of the Americans. Interestingly, James Leutzespeculates that Godfrey assumed the U.S. reluctance to engage in technical exchanges was basedon embarrassment rooted in American technical inferiority, an indication that technical chauvinismcut both ways. For additional information see Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 54;Zimmerman, 28-29.174 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 173. For additional information see MacLachlan, 216-29;Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 51, Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 140-141.175 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 140; MacLachlan, 216.51
information did have an impact on Kirk, his desire to reciprocate these exchangeswas based on his fear that, if the U.S. did not reciprocate, the British would eventuallycut him off completely. Kirk’s repeated calls for a more liberal exchangepolicy on the part of the U.S. Navy were based on his assessment “that as theBritish Navy gains in war experience they will gradually outdistance us in manytechnical subjects. It has seemed to me [to] our benefit, on the whole, to seize anyopportunity for making exchanges.” 176 Kirk, like Godfrey, saw that the U.S.would one day fight in the war and, when that happened, America would be onthe British side. War was, for Kirk, the great laboratory, and cutting off access tothat source of information for short-term political interests was a policy Kirk didnot agree with, although he assured his superiors that he would stand by theirdecisions as they had the broader view of the situation. 177NID Information Exchange with the U.S. Naval AttachéDevelopments from June 1939 through May 1940 demonstrate that Godfreydid use information as a tool to forge a closer bond with Kirk, hoping this wouldresult in closer cooperation between the two governments. At their first meeting,Godfrey told Kirk that he “would be free to see him at any time on any subject”and Kirk felt that a close liaison could be established because the British wanted“to keep in close touch with an eye on eventualities.” 178 Soon after this visit, Godfreytook Kirk to the basement of the Admiralty where he was shown the plotroom and country desks. Although he was not allowed into some of the rooms,such as the Code and Signal Room, he was shown the communications center andwas given a briefing on the British HF/DF stations and the associated equipmentused to obtain crossfixes. 179 During this same period, Godfrey also provided Kirksome strategic intelligence regarding German war preparations; namely, by sharinga report that the DNI expected the war would begin by mid-August. He also176 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 3 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. Cited hereafter as Kirk, Letter to Anderson,3 November 1939. In addition to the references cited above where Kirk advocates for closerexchange with the British see also Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral WalterS. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 5 January 1940, Kirk Papers, 1.177Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 3 November 1939, 1.178Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 20 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2.179Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. The Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centerwould not officially stand up until August 1939, though the arrangement Kirk describes is verysimilar to the setup for the OIC described by Patrick Beesly. For additional information see Beesly,Very Special Intelligence, 19-23.52
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
Page 14 and 15: action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
Page 16 and 17: officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
Page 18 and 19: ships in violation of treaty limits
Page 20 and 21: assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
Page 22 and 23: might bear on their work.” 39 As
Page 24 and 25: ility over time, its operational in
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
Page 28 and 29: told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
Page 30 and 31: ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
Page 34: ecame one of the primary sources of
Page 37 and 38: of shoring up their strategic weakn
Page 39 and 40: mon framework for negotiation with
Page 43 and 44: assuaged British concerns about the
Page 45 and 46: In the area of intelligence exchang
Page 47 and 48: clear to the Americans that if they
Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
Page 51 and 52: praised the fighting spirit of the
Page 53 and 54: through November of 1940 persuaded
Page 55 and 56: and Great Britain. His principalcon
Page 57 and 58: eceived by the British and from the
Page 59 and 60: gear designed by the British. Altho
Page 61: American Attitudes On Intelligence
Page 65 and 66: the affair. 183 This lack of resent
Page 67 and 68: tion exchanges. Even more significa
Page 69 and 70: nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
Page 75 and 76: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
Page 79 and 80: Since the Tizard Mission had only a
Page 81 and 82: appropriating large increases to th
Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
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Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
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Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
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________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
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Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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