firmly believed that British policies would create a pan-Asian, anti-whitebacklash in the Far East. 73 Historian John Charmley probably best summarizedthe American view of British colonialism when he stated that the “veryspeed with which the Japanese overran the British Empire in the Far East convincedmany Americans that the British were not only imperialists, but bunglingimperialists.” 74Other Aspects of Wilsonian IdealismBesides anti-colonialism, other principles of Wilsonian idealism were a sourceof friction for the British, as well. They were, in fact, economic rivals of theAmericans, and they interpreted Wilsonian calls for increased free trade asextremely threatening and meant to consolidate and perpetuate the ascendancy ofthe U.S. in the post-World War I period. 75 British views on American anti-colonialismwere colored by resentment because American ascendancy was also coupledwith increasing American isolationism. Many resented a peace in Europethat they believed had been dictated to them by Wilson, yet when the time cameto enforce an unworkable treaty, the Americans had chosen a path of disengagement.76 In the minds of many British policymakers, Wilsonian idealism was ahollow concept and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain probably bestsummarized the prevailing view in England when he stated that “it is always bestand safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words.” 77Mesopotamia: Free Trade Advocacy and British ResentmentAn excellent example of the tensions created by the two countries’ differingviews on Wilsonian principles can be found in the State Department’s ForeignRelations of the United States series for 1920. Within three years of the war, theU.S. and the UK were engaged in a rather acrimonious dispute concerning theBritish mandate in Mesopotamia, modern-day Iraq, and the access to the oil concessionsin that region. By the terms of the San Remo Agreement of 24 April1920, the British and French had received various mandates in the Middle Eastunder the provision that other countries would have fair and equal access to the73Aldrich, 124.74 Charmley, 54.75 Charmley, 13. For a concrete example of the economic rivalry and how it extended to theactions of the U.S. Navy and ONI, Jeffrey Dorwart relates a story concerning Captain Frank Hill,U.S. Naval Attaché in Brazil during the 1920s. He states that “[a]pparently, much of their intelligencework went toward counteracting British influence, including outbidding Vickers and Armstrongto win a lucrative contract for Bethlehem Steel to repair Brazilian battleships.” See Dorwart,Conflict of Duty, 137.76 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 5-6.77 Charmley, 16.21
esources of these areas. 78 At one point, the U.S. received word that there was asecret agreement between the British and French to exclusively exploit theresources of these mandates for their own purposes. In a letter to the BritishAmbassador, the U.S. Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, informed the UK thatAmerica expected the mandates to be “governed in such a way as to assure equaltreatment in law and in fact to the commerce of all nations,” and further stipulatedthat if a secret agreement existed between the British and the French it would“result in a grave infringement of the mandate principle, which was formulatedfor the purpose of removing...some of the principle [sic] causes of internationaldifferences.” 79The British responded to the American concerns with a lengthy missive fromthe British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, which, although in diplomaticlanguage, dismissed the concerns of the U.S. as irrelevant in this matterbecause the administration of Mesopotamia was a League of Nations matter and,since the U.S. was not a League member, it had no right to dictate policy to theBritish. The U.S. response was masterfully eloquent and diplomatic but it madeclear to the British that the shortage of petroleum had created a situation wherebythe U.S. would do what was needed to ensure free trade in the resources of Mesopotamiaso that “the most enlightened principles recognized by states as appropriatefor the peaceful ordering of their economic relations” could be followed. 80 Ina response reminiscent of the recent diplomatic conflict between France and theU.S. over UN policy on Iraq, the U.S. essentially labeled as specious the Britishargument that their non-participation in the League of Nations curtailed theirrights in this matter. The view in the U.S. was that[s]uch powers as the Allied and Associated nations may enjoy or wield,in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated areas,accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Powers.The United States, as a participant in that conflict and as a contributor toits successful issue, cannot consider any of the associated powers...debarredfrom the discussion of its consequences. 81The U.S.’s selective withdrawal from international affairs amid increasinglyisolationist sentiment culminated in the American Neutrality Laws, which78 Department of State, “The American Charge’ to the Secretary General of the French ForeignOffice—Aide Memoire,” 7 August 1920, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920 2 (Washington,DC: GPO, 1936): 668. Cited hereafter as FRUS 1920, vol. 2.79 FRUS 1920, vol. 2, 658-659.80 FRUS 1920, vol. 2, 672.81 FRUS 1920, vol. 2, 671-672. Emphasis added by the present author.22
- Page 1 and 2: COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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- Page 8 and 9: FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
- Page 10 and 11: PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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the French, a point which would not
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equested that RADM Ghormley remain
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when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
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it was not official U.S. policy. St
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efforts that had begun with the Sta
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high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
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to successfully interpret the instr
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to little more than a nebulous stat
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to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
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Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
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Godfrey’s main concern was most l
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possesses complementary capabilitie
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2. Be prepared to give something of
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had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
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________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
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Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1