COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

it was not official U.S. policy. Stark clearly saw that there was a need to formalizeall the work Ghormley had done, or the U.S. Navy would be ill-prepared tocooperate with the British when the two countries became allies. 276 Soon afterthis, with the election now behind the President, the U.S. acceded to the Britishrequest, made long ago, for formal staff talks. 277 Stark notified Ghormley, tellinghim to let the British know these would be frank and honest discussionsbetween equals. 278 Ghormley and Kirk, through the Standardization of ArmsTalks and the Bailey Committee, had laid the groundwork for alliance and theBritish efforts to entice the U.S. into cooperation were now beginning to bearfruit. Although these new staff talks would also remain secret, Ghormley andKirk would continue to play key roles in the development of the alliance whenthey traveled back to the United States to prepare for the ABC-1 talks, whichwould be held in Washington DC.ABC-1 Talks—29 January 1941–27 March 1941The plenary session of the ABC-1 talks was held on 29 January 1941. Thesenior U.S. member at the talks was Army Major General S. D. Embick. RADMGhormley was designated as the senior naval representative, with RADM Turner,the Navy’s War Plans Officer, and CAPT Kirk, now the DNI, assisting. 279 CNOStark stressed to the group that the security of the talks was of the utmost importancebecause, if word of them leaked out it would likely “cause a most seriousdelay in the coordination of our plans for war and a retarding effect on the passageof the Lend-Lease Bill,” which was then making its way through Congress.280 The purpose of the talks was to “determine the best methods by whichthe armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth...coulddefeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelledto resort to war.” 281 To this end, the participants were supposed to deter-276“Stark Letter to Ghormley,” 16 November 1940, Stark Papers; Harold Stark, ADM, USN,Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN,19 November 1940,Stark Papers.277 The U.S. accepted on 29 November 1940. For additional information see Reynolds, 184;Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 42-44.278 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 44-45.279COMNAVEU Administrative History, 9; Harold Stark, ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Operations,Letter to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN, 24 January 1941, Strategic Planning; “Minutesof the Plenary Meeting Held in Navy Department,” 29 January 1941, Strategic Planning. Citedhereafter as “Plenary Meeting,” 29 January 1941, Strategic Planning.280 Plenary Meeting,” 29 January 1941, Strategic Planning.281 Department of the Navy, “Report on United States-British Staff Conversations,” 27 March1941, Stark Papers. Cited hereafter as “Report on U.S.-UK Staff Talks,” 27 March 1941, StarkPapers.78