COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

tion exchanges. Even more significant for Kirk, he was informed by Godfrey thatthe Admiralty would now allow personnel from the U.S. naval attaché office toinspect damaged British ships in dry-dock. Kirk was ecstatic at this opportunityand quickly dispatched his assistant naval attachés to Bath where they couldinspect ships damaged during a recent German attack on Scapa Flow. This privilegewas exclusive to the American attachés and Kirk was full of praise for theopenness that the British displayed in giving his personnel virtually unrestrictedaccess to the damaged vessels and answering any enquires his men had. 190Also in March 1940, Kirk met with the British comptroller, ADM Fraser, whorequested information on stern hangers and aircraft-dropped depth charges inexchange for access to the British ships. But ADM Fraser also told Kirk that itwas the “1st Sea Lord’s express wish—that we should not be perpetually ‘bargaining’,but if, on a ‘goodwill’ basis we could give them an occasionallead...they, for their part, were very glad to be helpful.” 191 Here was both thepromise and the implied threat to Kirk, that greater cooperation would reap evenmore information from the British, but continued reluctance on the part of theAmericans to honor any requests would make it difficult for the British to continuegiving the Americans such preferential treatment. British concerns in thisarea were understandable. Even though it appears the Americans were still passinginformation on Japanese naval movements to the British, as agreed to duringthe Ingersoll Mission in 1938, there is little evidence to indicate what else theU.S. was providing during this period. 192 Given Godfrey’s display of pique, notedabove, and Kirk’s repeated pleas to Anderson for more openness, we can deducethat the U.S. gave very little. 193190 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 21 March 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter toRear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 26 March 1940, KirkPapers, 1-3; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN,Director of Naval Intelligence, 29 March 1940, Kirk Papers, 1; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN,Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 3 April 1940, KirkPapers, 1-2.191Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 21 March 1940, Kirk Papers, 3. This was one of the information requestsGodfrey was referring to when he castigated Kirk for the lack of information exchange reciprocityon the part of the Americans.192 Bath, 25; Leutze, “Secret Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence,” 484.193 Even when requests made by the British were honored, mistakes were made. The U.S. Navydid eventually get around to providing the British information on airdropped depth charges, arequest first made in Fall 1939, but they did not do so until April 1940. To make matters worse, theNavy Department provided the information to the British Air Attaché, Group-Captain George Pirie,rather than to the British Naval Attaché, CAPT Curzon-Howe, this even though it was the RoyalNavy which had repeatedly made the request. Kirk advised Anderson to provide the information toCurzon-Howe. For additional information see Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to RearAdmiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 May 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2.56