COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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ecause it illustrates the larger geopolitical concerns that motivated British hesitancyto share information at this stage in the war. Godfrey told Kirkthat he felt they had done a great deal for us. He cited the visits to thedamaged ships, as well as the magnetic mine. He said he was constantlybeing told by people to whom he referred matters in which I[Kirk] was interested that the United States wasn’t in the war, andinsisted she was never coming into the war, so that various Divisionsof the Naval Staff...were intimating that, after all, why should theygive the American Navy information which they were earning withtheir own blood and sweat. He also made reference to the fact that ifall this material was furnished now; then, during the period of peace,say, 25 years or more which they hoped would follow this war, wewould be abreast of them throughout. 166Godfrey thus revealed that resentment of the U.S. for not entering the war, andBritish concerns that the U.S. would later use the information provided to them toeclipse Great Britain, were two other significant factors in the mind of the Admiralty’sofficers which prevented wider exchange of information. 167Kirk was sobered by Godfrey’s remarks and told DNI Anderson that Godfrey’sconcerns were legitimate. He explained how the British had requested informationon stern hangers, airdropped depth charges, underwater paint, and the latestAmerican naval exercise (Fleet Problem XXI), but that none of these requests hadbeen honored. Despite these tensions, by this time Kirk felt that he was receivingmore from the British than he had in the past and saw the relationship, whichseemed so badly fractured in December 1939, as improving. He reiterated to hissuperiors that the U.S. needed to reciprocate with their own exchanges becausethe British had much to share and the U.S. could not long expect “to get somethingfor nothing.” 168166 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 2.167For additional information on British concerns about their declining position relative to theU.S. and their fears of what cooperation with the U.S. might mean for the future of the Empire inthe post-war world, see Reynolds, 10, 15; Aldrich, xiv.168 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 2-3. Years later, Kirk would recall this time periodaccurately, telling the interviewer who assisted him with his reminiscences that, while the exchangeof information was not “wide-open,” the British were far more willing to share than were the Americans.For additional information see Kirk Reminiscences, 133.49
American Attitudes On Intelligence ExchangeSeptember 1939 to May 1940Since Kirk and Godfrey both observed that the exchange of information duringthis period appeared somewhat one-sided, what were the American reasonsfor restricting the flow of information to the British at this juncture? Britishrefusals to share information during the chaotic first few months of the war suggestedto some personnel in the U.S. Navy that the British were untrustworthyand capricious, and they were disinclined to honor British requests for informationbecause of this attitude. 169 Domestic political concerns, continually a constrainton U.S. foreign policy moves, were also a factor that weighed heavilyagainst getting too close to the British. Despite the rebuffs, Kirk continued topress for something he could give the British in exchange for what they hadshared with the U.S. Navy. Even something as simple as getting a Britishofficer permission to observe Fleet Problem XXI was impossible. When askedabout why the Navy could not accede to this request, considering the fact theBritish had allowed U.S. Naval Officers to observe some of their operations,Anderson told Kirk that there was nothing he could do about it and, while hecould not elaborate, the refusal “was made by higher authority” and he agreedwith the decision. 170 The most likely explanation for the refusal, given Anderson’scryptic rationale, were domestic political concerns, as the media and Congresswere vigilant for any signs the administration was moving the country ina direction that would embroil it in another war. The risk was too high that newsof a British observer with the U.S. fleet would leak, which would be costly toboth President Roosevelt and the Navy Department in terms of public good willand Congressional support.While Kirk acknowledged that Anderson had a bigger picture of the situationthan he did, he thought the U.S. was missing a golden opportunity by not reciprocatingwith them as war was causing the British to make rapid technologicaladvances. 171 Kirk found it hard to comprehend why his superiors could not seewhy “it appears so simply to our advantage to open up with them [the British]...thatit is a puzzle to me...to appreciate the factors which appear to weigh soheavily against such a policy.” 172 Despite his admiration for how the war was169 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 54-55.170 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Captain AlanGoodrich Kirk, USN, 1 April 1940, Kirk Papers.171 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, n.d., Kirk Papers. This was a handwritten note attached to Kirk, Letter toAnderson, 24 April 1940. Since it seems to respond to the views Anderson expressed in his 1 April1940 letter to Kirk, cited directly above, it is likely he added the note as a postscript to his 24 April1940 correspondence after receiving Anderson’s 1 April 1940 letter.172 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 4.50
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
Page 10 and 11: PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
Page 14 and 15: action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
Page 16 and 17: officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
Page 18 and 19: ships in violation of treaty limits
Page 20 and 21: assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
Page 22 and 23: might bear on their work.” 39 As
Page 24 and 25: ility over time, its operational in
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
Page 28 and 29: told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
Page 30 and 31: ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
Page 34: ecame one of the primary sources of
Page 37 and 38: of shoring up their strategic weakn
Page 39 and 40: mon framework for negotiation with
Page 43 and 44: assuaged British concerns about the
Page 45 and 46: In the area of intelligence exchang
Page 47 and 48: clear to the Americans that if they
Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
Page 51 and 52: praised the fighting spirit of the
Page 53 and 54: through November of 1940 persuaded
Page 55 and 56: and Great Britain. His principalcon
Page 57 and 58: eceived by the British and from the
Page 59: gear designed by the British. Altho
Page 63 and 64: information did have an impact on K
Page 65 and 66: the affair. 183 This lack of resent
Page 67 and 68: tion exchanges. Even more significa
Page 69 and 70: nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
Page 75 and 76: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
Page 79 and 80: Since the Tizard Mission had only a
Page 81 and 82: appropriating large increases to th
Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
Page 101 and 102: Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
Page 103 and 104: Godfrey’s main concern was most l
Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
Page 107 and 108: 2. Be prepared to give something of
Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
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________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
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Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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