COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

Ghormley had sent word back from London that the British desired formal stafftalks to discuss how U.S.-UK cooperation would work in the event the U.S.entered the war. To provide that direction, Stark and a team of planners thatincluded his Deputy CNO, VADM Ingersoll, and his Director of War Plans, RearAdmiral Richmond Kelly Turner, drafted the 12-page memo over a 10-day periodand submitted it to Knox, who forwarded it to Roosevelt for a decision. 142 WhileU.S. Army and Navy planners had focused attention on an Atlantic-first strategyas early as 1939 with the RAINBOW FIVE plan, most strategic planning up untilthat point had been oriented on Japan. 143 The situation in Europe had changed allthat and Stark, despite his reservations about the British, clearly saw that America’sfuture success was tied to an Atlantic-first strategy, which meant aiding theBritish. Setting out the parameters of the strategic problem which faced the U.S.,Stark said “if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere;but...if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while wemight not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.” 144After outlining alternative courses of action, Stark persuasively argued whydefense of Great Britain was in the U.S. national interest. Once again, displayinga mild disdain for the British, he stated that he felt “the British were over-optimisticas to their chances for ultimate success” and that success would require strongallies as “[a]lone the British Empire lacks the manpower and the material meansto master Germany.” 145 Citing the significant danger posed by the European situation,Stark forcefully recommended alliance with the British and explained howthe focus of effort must first be victory in Europe with a holding action in the FarEast. 146 To further this objective, Stark recommended that the U.S. militaryengage in “secret staff talks with the British military....to reach agreement and laydown plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find itnecessary to enter the war.” 147 Roosevelt approved Stark’s recommendation andthe staff talks he recommended did occur. Stark’s desire to aid Britain, like that ofRoosevelt and Knox, was based on strategic realities rather than on pro-Britishattitudes. Still, just because Stark saw that aiding the British was in the best interestsof the U.S., it was not a foregone conclusion that he would, by November1940, overcome his suspicions concerning their motives enough to recommendengaging in secret staff talks with them. British actions from the summer of 1939142 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Letter to Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, 12 November 1940, in Stark Papers.143 Baer, 18-19.144 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Memorandum to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 12November 1940, in Stark Papers, 1. Cited hereafter as Plan Dog Memo.145 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 4-5.146 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 23-24.147 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 2641