COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

Standardization of Arms Talks—15-31 August 1940The Standardization of Arms Talks was the cover name for secret staff talksheld between the military services of the U.S. and the UK in the late summer of1940. As with the Tizard Mission, these talks came as the result of a suggestionmade to Roosevelt by the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian. In a meeting withthe President and the Secretary of State on 11 June 1940, Lothian informedRoosevelt “that he [Lothian] had received from Mr. Churchill...a suggestion thatthere might be staff conferences between the naval people of our two governmentsin regard to fleet movements both in the Atlantic and the Pacific.” 246 Interestingly,after Roosevelt had agreed to these talks, there was some discussion onthe British side as to whether these informal staff talks should be combined withTizard’s technical exchange mission, which would occur almost concurrently.The British Foreign Office persuasively argued against taking this tack, notingthat engagement with the Americans on as many levels as possible was needed toobtain U.S. cooperation. 247Why did U.S. policymakers accede to this particular request, especially whenthey had been so sensitive to any tilt toward England during this election year?While Donovan’s reports on the British ability to prevail in the war were certainlyinfluential in alleviating U.S. fears that the secrets they provided Britain wouldnot rapidly fall into enemy hands, the U.S. delegation had in fact left for Englandon 12 July 1940, which was before Donovan arrived in London, making it doubtfulthat Donovan’s reports on the situation in England played a role in the decisionto send the delegation, as Dorwart suggests. 248 The fall of France, however,had a major impact on the psyche of American policymakers and the Americanpeople. Congress responded to the fears generated by France’s downfall by246 Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 11 June1940, in FRUS 1940 vol. 3, 36. There is some confusion in the literature as to when this offer wasmade, although the archival data clearly show an official offer was made on 11 June 1940 and thisinformation is consistent with that found in the Commander Naval Forces, Europe AdministrativeHistory. James Leutze contends the offer was made in May 1940, which may have happened,although it is unclear why this second offer would have been necessary if Roosevelt had acceptedthen, or why it would be proffered again if Roosevelt had rejected it just weeks before. Ralph Erskinestates the offer was made to COL William Donovan during his visit to London in July, althoughthis is unlikely as preparations for the visit of the U.S. delegation were already being made by thetime Donovan arrived in England. For additional information see COMNAVEU Admin History, 1;Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 57; Ralph Erskine, “Churchill and the Start of the Ultra-Magic Deals,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 1 (Spring1997): 58.247 Zimmerman, 82-83.248 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 40-41; Dorwart, 143.69