COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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PROLOGUESince World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom have mutuallybenefited from an unprecedented “special relationship” with regard to intelligencesharing and cooperation. What were the origins of that relationship and what lessonscan be derived from its development? While it may seem obvious that thecommon Axis threat drove both countries to increased levels of intelligence sharing,the extent of the cooperation eventually attained would have surprised manyon both sides of the Atlantic prior to World War II. Despite a brief period as alliesduring World War I, the U.S. and the UK quickly reverted to their traditional rolesas strategic competitors following the conclusion of the Great War. A highly visibleaspect of that competition was in the area of naval forces, in which both countriesinvested considerable diplomatic, economic, and military resources.Notwithstanding this rivalry, their naval intelligence cooperation during WorldWar II is often cited as one of the most successful in history. How did this “specialrelationship” develop, given the contentiousness that existed between these twocountries in the interwar period? An analysis of this period indicates one significantfactor was the aggressive pursuit of naval intelligence cooperation by theBritish as part of their larger strategy to secure U.S. entry into the war. The tacticsthe British employed to secure this cooperation are of interest, as history hasshown the British were able to overcome significant distrust on the part of Americanofficials, who were extremely wary of British intentions.Like the UK, the U.S. is interested in developing intelligence cooperationarrangements with states, such as Russia and India, with whom our country hashad inimical or competitive relationships. 1 An assessment of the UK’s overallstrategy for establishing a closer intelligence relationship with the U.S. can yieldinsights into effective strategies the U.S. could use to enhance intelligence cooperationwith countries that have had, or continue to have, competitive relations withthe United States. Second, an analysis of this subject is of historical importance tothe Intelligence Community (IC) since the intelligence-sharing agreementsbetween the U.S., the UK, and its former dominions had their antecedents in theWorld War II period and it is important to understand the rationale behind their1 The White House, “Joint Statement Between U.S. and India,” 9 November 2001, The WhiteHouse, URL:, accessed16 November 2003; The White House, “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. CondoleezzaRice on the President’s Trip to Europe and Russia,” The White House, URL:, accessed 16 November 2003.ix
development. Third, this was a critical period in defining the components of whatwould later become the U.S. IC, particularly naval intelligence. The Office ofNaval Intelligence (ONI), in addition to engaging in internecine battles with otherintelligence organizations, also faced internal Navy disputes over its own rolesand functions. Understanding this period is important to understanding the roleONI currently plays in the IC structure.x
Page 1 and 2: COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
Page 4: The Joint Military Intelligence Col
Page 8 and 9: FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
Page 14 and 15: action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
Page 16 and 17: officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
Page 18 and 19: ships in violation of treaty limits
Page 20 and 21: assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
Page 22 and 23: might bear on their work.” 39 As
Page 24 and 25: ility over time, its operational in
Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
Page 28 and 29: told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
Page 30 and 31: ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
Page 34: ecame one of the primary sources of
Page 37 and 38: of shoring up their strategic weakn
Page 39 and 40: mon framework for negotiation with
Page 43 and 44: assuaged British concerns about the
Page 45 and 46: In the area of intelligence exchang
Page 47 and 48: clear to the Americans that if they
Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
Page 51 and 52: praised the fighting spirit of the
Page 53 and 54: through November of 1940 persuaded
Page 55 and 56: and Great Britain. His principalcon
Page 57 and 58: eceived by the British and from the
Page 59 and 60: gear designed by the British. Altho
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American Attitudes On Intelligence
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information did have an impact on K
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the affair. 183 This lack of resent
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tion exchanges. Even more significa
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nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
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good will and encouraged greater co
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would merely show Donovan “the be
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Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
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still a powerful influence. While Z
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Since the Tizard Mission had only a
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appropriating large increases to th
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the French, a point which would not
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equested that RADM Ghormley remain
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when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
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it was not official U.S. policy. St
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efforts that had begun with the Sta
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high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
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to successfully interpret the instr
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to little more than a nebulous stat
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to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
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Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
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Godfrey’s main concern was most l
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possesses complementary capabilitie
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2. Be prepared to give something of
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had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122:
________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 130 and 131:
Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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