COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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Signals <strong>Intelligence</strong>(SIGINT) 2-3, 7, 10, 13, 17, 36, 47, 52, 72-73, 76, 80-84, 86-88, 90-91Sims, Admiral William 8, 17Sinclair, Admiral “Q” 11Singapore 30, 34, 79Sinkov Mission 82-84, 86Sinkov, Abraham 83Special Naval Observer (SPECNO), London 40, 71, 81Special Operations Executive (SOE) 2-3, 10, 58, 87-88“special relationship” vii, 15, 99Standardization of Arms Talks 67, 69-74, 95Stark, Admiral Harold “Betty” 8, 37, 40-42, 70, 74, 77-78, 93Station CAST 7, 13, 86Stephenson, Sir William 13, 58-61, 89, 96Strong, Brigadier General G. V. 71TThompson Case 6Tizard Mission 55, 64-69, 71, 96Tizard, Sir Henry 63-68, 96Turner, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly 8, 41, 78-79UU.S. domestic politics, impacts on foreignpolicy 29, 33, 37-39, 48, 50, 59, 61, 69, 78, 93U.S. intelligence 1-4, 23U.S. naval attaches 4, 6, 26, 43, 77-86U.S. Neutrality Laws 22-23, 38, 59, 62U.S.-British Naval Rivalry 15-20VVinson, Carl 31WWarren Harding 18Washington Naval Conference, 1920-21 18, 25Welles, Sumner 31119
Wilkinson, Rear Admiral Theodore S. 9Willson, Captain Russell 32-35, 44-45Wilson, Woodrow 17Wilsonian Idealism 20-21World War I vii, 2-3, 8, 12, 16-19, 37, 70YYarnell, Admiral Harry E. 30, 38“Y” Signals 13ZZacharias, Rear Admiral Ellis 5120
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
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officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
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ships in violation of treaty limits
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assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
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might bear on their work.” 39 As
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ility over time, its operational in
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Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
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told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
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ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
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firmly believed that British polici
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ecame one of the primary sources of
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of shoring up their strategic weakn
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mon framework for negotiation with
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assuaged British concerns about the
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In the area of intelligence exchang
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clear to the Americans that if they
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in his mind worked against closer c
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praised the fighting spirit of the
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through November of 1940 persuaded
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and Great Britain. His principalcon
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eceived by the British and from the
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gear designed by the British. Altho
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American Attitudes On Intelligence
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information did have an impact on K
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the affair. 183 This lack of resent
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tion exchanges. Even more significa
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nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
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good will and encouraged greater co
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would merely show Donovan “the be
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Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
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still a powerful influence. While Z
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Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
Page 101 and 102: Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
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Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
Page 107 and 108: 2. Be prepared to give something of
Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
Page 112 and 113: GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
Page 116: APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120: ________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122: ________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 123 and 124: Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
Page 126 and 127: INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
Page 128 and 129: IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
Page 132: PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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