COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

had colonial possessions of its own. Fourth, the UK saw the U.S. as its maineconomic rival. This, coupled with a historic distrust of the ability of U.S. governmentofficials to keep secrets, made the British hesitant to cooperate withthe U.S. in the period after the Great War.Stereotypes and MisperceptionsStereotyping other peoples is always easy. For most Americans, the UK wasseen as a class-based society, where birth mattered more than merit for one’sadvancement, and many held that the UK was not truly a democracy becausetheir monarchial-parliamentary system did not resemble the republican form ofgovernment practiced in America. Additionally, America’s revolutionary heritage,its large Irish immigrant population, and resentment of colonialism wereall factors responsible for creating a feeling of distrust regarding British intentionsand actions on the part of many Americans. This distrust was not a universalfeeling, as many in the upper tier of American society idolized the Britishand there was significant respect for British cultural achievements at all levelsof U.S. society. 55 Misperceptions also abounded in the UK and many in the rulingcircles of that country were largely ignorant of how the U.S. functioned,both socially and politically, a condition that would persist throughout the interwarperiod and a factor that would later work against the British in theirattempts to influence U.S. policy. 56Naval Rivalry and The Impact of Naval Arms LimitationsNaval RivalryU.S. participation in the Great War was a watershed event in U.S.-UK relationsand, while the period under review in this chapter saw some easing of thetensions between the two countries, there were rough patches in the alliancewhich would serve as irritants in the future relations between the two navies.Despite the decision to enter the war on the U.S. side, Samuel Morison hasnoted that the leadership of the U.S. Navy was highly distrustful of the British.For example, before departing on his mission to England to coordinate theefforts of U.S. naval forces engaged in the war, Admiral William F. Sims was55 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study in CompetitiveCo-operation (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 23-24; Smith,Ultra-Magic Deals, 1-2; Stephen Budiansky, “The Difficult Beginnings of U.S. British CodebreakingCooperation,” in American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000, ed. DavidStafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 50-51.56 Reynolds, 12; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), letter to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. AsiaticFleet, 12 November 1940, Papers of Harold R. Stark, Operational Archives Branch, Naval HistoricalCenter, Washington, D.C. Collection cited hereafter as Stark Papers.16