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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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4. Engagement attempts should be multilevel and multifariousThe number and types of engagement attempts will depend largely on what isat stake in securing a closer relationship with the target country. For the British,the stakes were national survival; consequently their engagement attempts tookplace on as many levels as possible, using a variety of forums. The military-tomilitaryintelligence exchanges characterized here were just one element of amultilevel effort to secure U.S. cooperation in the war. Even within this limitedarena, the British sought to engage at any level they could. From the low-levelobserver missions, through the ALUSNA London office, and on to the office ofthe CNO and the Secretary of the Navy, the British sent a relatively consistentmessage that they wanted U.S. support and they were willing to openly sharetheir secrets to obtain it. The types of exchanges they were willing to engage inare also significant. They demonstrated a willingness to share many differenttypes of information—technical, operational, and political, for example—reasoningthat the more varied the forums of exchange, the more likely they were topositively influence a key decisionmaker. In less desperate circumstances thanthose faced by the British, it is doubtful that any country would engage in such awide-ranging exchange of secret information.5. Openness and candor are essential for building trustGranted, this is an obvious point, but one which was vital to establishing thecooperative relationship between the U.S. and the UK. Kirk, Ghormley, Donovan,and numerous others marveled at the openness and frankness of the Britishin discussing their war situation and in the provision of secret information. Manywere looking for any sign that the British were once again poised to treat theAmericans as junior partners, which had aggravated many during the Great War,as they felt the British had often been less than candid on many issues. Even Kirk,who has been seen by some as very pro-British, due to his advocacy of greatercooperation with them, was extremely wary of the information he received fromthe British. Repeated instances of British openness and candor, though, overcameU.S. distrust sufficiently to enable the cooperative relationship between the twocountries.6. Be mindful of the target’s concerns about the relationshipDespite all their efforts, the British were still prone to miscalculation abouthow some of their overtures would be perceived by the Americans. A case inpoint was Godfrey’s visit, during which he attempted to get the U.S. to adoptsome of the same interdepartmental intelligence organizations that the Britishpossessed. Godfrey’s efforts demonstrated a lack of understanding of the U.S.political landscape and American sensitivities about being told by the British howto run their affairs. Godfrey should have borne in mind the experience the British97

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