COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

period. 348 The conditions in the interwar period were marked by increasinginstability. While the primary reaction from the American public to this instabilitywas isolationism, Americans became increasingly more tolerant of a foreignpolicy tilt toward Great Britain once the war began to impact U.S.interests.For both parties examined in this study, the risks of intelligence sharing weresignificant. The major obstacles to closer cooperation for U.S. policymakers duringthe critical summer of 1940 were determining whether England would survivethe war and whether they could be trusted to keep the nascent intelligencerelationship secret. The main factor the British had to overcome was their concernabout lax U.S. counterintelligence practices. Despite these concerns, thebenefits were considerable. Given the success of the British effort in securing the“special relationship” with the U.S. in intelligence cooperation in the interwarperiod, some lessons can be drawn from the experience:1. Be prepared to quickly capitalize on a shared crisisThe British were able to rapidly exploit instances when the sense of crisisamong U.S. decisionmakers was highest. During periods of higher tension, countriesare more willing to seek solutions to their problems that would have beenunacceptable during times of greater stability. For example, the British hadattempted to engage the U.S. in a closer relationship on Japan policy followingthe abortive London Naval Conference of 1935, but they met with little successuntil the Panay Incident in December 1937 heightened U.S. concerns about theJapanese threat. After the Panay Incident, the British immediately engaged U.S.decisionmakers once again and secured the Ingersoll Mission for their efforts.Similarly, British overtures to the U.S. in the period following the start of the warin September 1939 met with little success. The defeat of Belgium, Holland, andFrance, however, created a sense of crisis in the U.S., one the British exploited tosecure Donovan’s visit to England and U.S. participation in the Standardizationof Arms Talks. The Bailey Committee Report shows that the British were ready tocapitalize on initiatives like the Standardization of Arms Talks. The report demonstratesthat the British prepared well for these opportunities, clearly definingtheir goals, the types of information they wished to exchange, and the methods bywhich those exchanges would take place, factors that decisionmakers must takeinto account before engaging in cooperative intelligence ventures.348 Wirtz, 93-94.95