COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

tions would be implemented, the fact that the British and the Americans werewilling to consider this closer relationship was a significant change from conditionsa year earlier.The last meeting of the Bailey Committee on 16 October 1940 also concernedintelligence but was specifically focused on “the general interchange of intelligencebetween the British and United States naval authorities in the Far East.” 272Discussions centered around ways that Far East intelligence cooperation could beenhanced, focusing on the possibility of establishing liaison officers between theFar East commands and establishing a secure method of exchanging intelligence.Recommendations were also made to instruct the U.S. and British naval attachésin Tokyo to liberalize their information exchange and to have ONI and NIDexchange any monographs they possessed on Japan and the mandated islands inthe Pacific under its control. 273 To support U.S. planning efforts for action againstJapan, Ghormley forwarded a complete disposition of all British forces in the FarEast as well as the latest British intelligence estimates on the disposition of Dutchforces in the Pacific. 274 While CNO Stark was unimpressed with the “British FarEastern War Plan [which]...shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking,”he instructed the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral T. C. Hart, to developa framework for cooperation with the British in the Far East and congratulatedGhormley for convincing “the British that there is a Western Pacific in which theUnited States is interested and in which they also have a great interest.” 275While Stark still obviously had disdain for the British, he did not let his personalfeelings get in the way of his strategic vision. This was the same periodduring which he completed the Plan Dog Memo, which outlined the frameworkof the Atlantic-first strategy, centered on cooperation with the British. Stark forwardeda copy of the plan to Ghormley, stating that he could share its existenceand contents with the British, but he was not to show it to them in its entirety as271 “Bailey Committee 6th Meeting Minutes,” Strategic Planning, 2-3.272 “B. C. I. Fourteenth Meeting, United States Naval Co-operation, Minutes of Meeting held onWednesday, 16th October, 1940,” 16 October, Strategic Planning, 1. Cited hereafter as “BaileyCommittee 14th Meeting Minutes,” Strategic Planning.273 “Bailey Committee 14th Meeting Minutes,” Strategic Planning, 1-2.274Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, USN, Chief ofNaval Operations, 30 October 1940, Strategic Planning.275 Harold Stark, ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Captain T. C. Hart, USN,Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 12 November 1940, Stark Papers, 1; Harold Stark, ADM,USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN,16 November1940, Stark Papers. Cited hereafter as “Stark Letter to Ghormley,” 16 November 1940, StarkPapers.77