COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

when they had recovered a magnetic mine in late November. 188 The Britishcontinued to update Kirk on the progress of their exploitation of the mine andprovided him details on the experimental countermeasure techniques theywere using to counter it. Clearly, British openness on this important matterwas beginning to have an impact on Kirk, as he had taken to referring toCAPT Morse as “his friend” in correspondence. 189 As shown above, it wasafter the New Year when Kirk became very forceful in his letters to Andersonconcerning the need to reciprocate to keep the valuable stream of informationcoming. While Kirk’s motivations may have been different from what Godfreyhoped they would be, as there are few expressions of sympathy for theBritish situation in Kirk’s correspondence, the Admiralty’s openness was havingthe desired effect on Kirk, who was vociferously advocating more cooperationbetween the two countries.For Kirk, the most significant breakthrough in the British attitude onexchanges came in March 1940. At that time, Godfrey told Kirk that the Britishwere in the process of forming a committee that would look into the matter ofexchanges and asked Kirk to come up with a list of U.S. information requirements.What Godfrey was alluding to was the British technical exchange missionthat would be led by one of England’s leading scientists, Dr. Henry Tizard. TheTizard mission, discussed in the next chapter, would have a profound and positiveeffect on the cooperation the U.S. would give the British in the matter of informa-188 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, Enclosure (A) to letter dated 6 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2; Alan GoodrichKirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence,24 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to RearAdmiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 9 November 1939, Kirk Papers.Interestingly, the offer to provide the U.S. information on asdic originated from Churchill, whooffered the technology as part of his campaign to entice Roosevelt into a closer relationship with theUK. In the preceding reference (Kirk’s 9 November 1939 letter to Anderson) Kirk remarks thatGodfrey was caught off guard when Kirk raised the subject of exchange of information on asdic,apparently unaware that Churchill had made the offer, which had filtered down from Rooseveltthrough the U.S. Navy Department to Kirk. The details of the exchange of asdic technology wouldtake many months to conclude. For additional information see Zimmerman, 43-46; Alan GoodrichKirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence,14 March 1940, Kirk Papers; James Leutze, “The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence:September 1939-May 1940,” Journal of Contemporary History 10, no. 3 (July 1975),472, cited hereafter as Leutze, “Secret Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence.”189 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directorof Naval Intelligence, 6 December 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2. Although Kirk never formed a close personalrelationship with Godfrey, he would fondly recall that he became good friends with ADMFraser, the Admiralty’s comptroller, and CAPT Miles, the Admiralty’s Director of Ordnance. Foradditional information see Kirk Reminiscences, 144-145.55