Ghormley had sent word back from London that the British desired formal stafftalks to discuss how U.S.-UK cooperation would work in the event the U.S.entered the war. To provide that direction, Stark and a team of planners thatincluded his Deputy CNO, VADM Ingersoll, and his Director of War Plans, RearAdmiral Richmond Kelly Turner, drafted the 12-page memo over a 10-day periodand submitted it to Knox, who forwarded it to Roosevelt for a decision. 142 WhileU.S. Army and Navy planners had focused attention on an Atlantic-first strategyas early as 1939 with the RAINBOW FIVE plan, most strategic planning up untilthat point had been oriented on Japan. 143 The situation in Europe had changed allthat and Stark, despite his reservations about the British, clearly saw that America’sfuture success was tied to an Atlantic-first strategy, which meant aiding theBritish. Setting out the parameters of the strategic problem which faced the U.S.,Stark said “if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere;but...if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while wemight not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.” 144After outlining alternative courses of action, Stark persuasively argued whydefense of Great Britain was in the U.S. national interest. Once again, displayinga mild disdain for the British, he stated that he felt “the British were over-optimisticas to their chances for ultimate success” and that success would require strongallies as “[a]lone the British Empire lacks the manpower and the material meansto master Germany.” 145 Citing the significant danger posed by the European situation,Stark forcefully recommended alliance with the British and explained howthe focus of effort must first be victory in Europe with a holding action in the FarEast. 146 To further this objective, Stark recommended that the U.S. militaryengage in “secret staff talks with the British military....to reach agreement and laydown plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find itnecessary to enter the war.” 147 Roosevelt approved Stark’s recommendation andthe staff talks he recommended did occur. Stark’s desire to aid Britain, like that ofRoosevelt and Knox, was based on strategic realities rather than on pro-Britishattitudes. Still, just because Stark saw that aiding the British was in the best interestsof the U.S., it was not a foregone conclusion that he would, by November1940, overcome his suspicions concerning their motives enough to recommendengaging in secret staff talks with them. British actions from the summer of 1939142 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Letter to Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, 12 November 1940, in Stark Papers.143 Baer, 18-19.144 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Memorandum to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 12November 1940, in Stark Papers, 1. Cited hereafter as Plan Dog Memo.145 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 4-5.146 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 23-24.147 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 2641
through November of 1940 persuaded Stark that the British were serious aboutforming an equal partnership with the U.S., a factor that would encourage theNavy’s leadership to authorize increased intelligence and technical exchangeswith the British during this critical period.42
- Page 1 and 2: COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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- Page 8 and 9: FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
- Page 10 and 11: PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
- Page 12 and 13: Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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- Page 22 and 23: might bear on their work.” 39 As
- Page 24 and 25: ility over time, its operational in
- Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
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- Page 32 and 33: firmly believed that British polici
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- Page 49 and 50: in his mind worked against closer c
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- Page 69 and 70: nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
- Page 71 and 72: good will and encouraged greater co
- Page 73 and 74: would merely show Donovan “the be
- Page 75 and 76: Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
- Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
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Godfrey’s main concern was most l
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possesses complementary capabilitie
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2. Be prepared to give something of
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had in forming its own Joint Intell
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GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
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APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
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APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
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________. Foreign Relations of the
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________. “The Secret of the Chur
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Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
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INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
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Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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