COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

ups of the early 20th century. 65 The loss of American sea power prompted thefuture Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to write a book entitled The Eclipse ofAmerican Sea Power, to address concerns on the part of the Navy that the “Admiralty...werelaughing up their sleeve at having put it over us [and are] very anxiousat the reaction....if American public opinion were adequately educated as tothe results of the treaty.” 66 While provisions were made to close some of the loopholesduring the London Naval Conference in 1930, it was clear to naval officerson both sides of the Atlantic that the rivalry between them had only been exacerbatedby their failed expectations regarding naval arms limitation. 67Although rivalry did not necessarily translate into fears that the two navieswould one day clash, many American naval officers were wary of the British.Fleet Admiral Ernest King’s attitudes were probably typical of the faction of U.S.officers who subscribed to the view that the British were not to be trusted. Eventhough some authors have noted that Naval War College war gaming against Britishforces was primarily designed to provide variety against the main ORANGEthreat (Japan), and while others have cited naval officers at the time who contendedthat war with Great Britain was not a realistic possibility, the fact thatKing wrote his Naval War College thesis in 1932 on the premise that the U.S.Navy needed to be prepared to fight both the UK and Japan demonstrates that notall officers were quite so sanguine about the potential for peace between the twocountries. 68 Although some have characterized King as a rampant Anglophobe,more balanced scholarship has demonstrated that it would be fair to say that hewas pro-American rather than anti-British. His views were based on his appreciationof the American naval tradition and on his not being impressed with the performanceof the Royal Navy in World War I, a navy which attempted to instructthe U.S. Navy in how to perform at sea, yet ran a porous blockade, fought aninconclusive engagement at Jutland, was slow to meet the submarine threat, andslow in adopting convoy operations. 69 Patrick Beesly, one of the foremost authorson British naval intelligence matters, in speaking of King, summarized the viewsof many in the U.S. Navy during the interwar period by stating that they were“devoted to [their] Service and determined that it should not again play second65The ratio of naval arms reached at the conference was 5:5:3 (U.S.:UK:Japan). The U.S.scrapped 845,740 tons and some of her most modern warships, while the British scrapped a totalof 605,975 tons. For additional information see: Morison, xxxvii, xlii; Coles, 125; Department ofState, “The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament,” 21 November 1921, in Foreign Relationsof the United States 1922 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1936): 53-60, cited hereafter as FRUS1922 vol. 1; “Statement Issued to the Press by the Conference on the Limitation of Armament,” 15December 1921, FRUS 1922 vol. 1, 130.66Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 24.67Morison, xl; Coles, 126.68Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 139-140; Muir, 480; Coles, 126.69Coles, 105-107, 125.19