COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

mon framework for negotiation with the British, which would give both countriesa better bargaining position against the Japanese. At the start of negotiations, U.S.and British goals for the conference were diametrically opposed. Norman Davis,the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, was given orders by Franklin Roosevelt topursue a 20 percent across-the-board reduction for naval forces and a 10- to 15-year extension to the terms of all existing naval arms limitations treaties then ineffect. If the 20 percent reduction could not be attained, the fallback position wasto have the British agree to maintain parity with the U.S. in naval forces. 91 PresidentRoosevelt instructed Davis to present the U.S. goals personally to PrimeMinister MacDonald, and to argue that the reduction in forces was needed to easetensions in the world. Other factors, such as fiscal constraints and American isolationistsentiments, were most likely just as significant in Roosevelt’s decision toadvocate for naval force reductions. 92 Reporting on his conversations with Mac-Donald to the President and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Davis reported thatthe British had actually been hoping the U.S. would agree to an increase in Britishnaval forces and they believed the U.S. did not truly understand how much theworld situation had changed since the last naval arms limitations talks, which hadbeen held in London in 1930. In particular, the British desired a substantialincrease in their cruiser strength, telling Davis that “in 1930 England and Americafaced a single problem, namely, the Japanese; whereas today America stillfaces only this single problem, England now also faces the acute problem ofEurope which is relatively academic to the United States.” 93 Although both sidesseemed diametrically opposed, within a few months of these conversations thedifferences in U.S. and the UK positions would become irrelevant in the face ofthe need to develop a common understanding of how best to respond to Japan’sdecision to abrogate its treaty obligations.The development of this common understanding would take place in the contextof a series of frank discussions between the American and British delegations,some of which were attended by the British Prime Minister. As winterapproached, negotiations no longer focused on U.S. desires to reduce naval forcesbecause the Japanese decision had made that position untenable for the Americans.During a discussion in November 1934, the British did attempt to get theU.S. to agree on a position concerning higher “qualitative” limits on naval cruiserstrength, but the U.S. delegation remained noncommittal. The major concern of91The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State, 19 June 1934, in ForeignRelations of the United States 1934 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 262. Cited hereafter asFRUS 1934 vol. 1. This cable, released by Ambassador Bingham, was actually from Norman Davis.92 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham), 26 June 1934, in FRUS1934 vol. 1, 277.93 The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State, 27 June 1934, in FRUS1934 vol. 1, 279.28