y which British combat experience was transmitted to the technical bureaus andthe operating forces back in America.Ghormley personally met with the Committee some 14 times between Septemberand October 1940. Although unofficial, these talks became the basis for theABC-1 staff talks that were to occur after the New Year. Rather than deal withspecific technical exchanges, these meetings concentrated on the various areas inwhich the Bailey report recommended cooperation with America, to prepare forthe eventual U.S. entry into the war. As Kirk had done in his reports from earlierin the year, Ghormley related to the CNO how impressed he was with the Britishwillingness to provide information and their determination to see the war throughto the end. Although the exchange was going well, he did have some major concerns.What alarmed him most was the possibility the British would cut off theexchange due to a lack of reciprocation. While he had relatively free access to anyinformation he wanted, he had heard reports that the British naval attaché,RADM Pott, had been treated poorly. He wrote to Stark that267 “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 1,” Subject: H.M.S. Hermes, 12 September1940; Records of the Naval Operating Forces, U.S. Naval Forces Europe Subject File: FromBailey Committee thru Bolero, Record Group 313; Stack Area 370, Row 30, Compartment 1, Shelf05, NN3-38-90-3; <strong>National</strong> Archives Building, College Park Maryland, collection cited hereafter asBailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 2,” Subject: RadioFrequencies, 12 September 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’sCommittee No. 3,” Subject: Royal Navy Publications, 12 September 1940; Bailey CommitteeMemos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 5,” Subject: Information on LandingOperations in Norway, 12 September 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for AdmiralBailey’s Committee No. 11,” Subject: Anti-aircraft Projectiles Containing Wire, 14 September1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 13,” Subject:Asdic Pamphlets, 19 September 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for AdmiralBailey’s Committee No. 19,” Subject: Asdic Attack Teacher Plans, 21 September 1940; BaileyCommittee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 25,” Subject: New Construction,7 October 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s CommitteeNo. 26,” Subject: Dakar Operations, 7 October 1940; Bailey Committee Memos.75
when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he is very restricted in his movements,notes are taken on all his conversations, and information is not freelygiven to him....Here the Admiralty receives Kirk’s representativeswith open arms. Some in fact have desks in the Admiralty so that thereis no information which is asked for which is not given, and much inaddition. 268Ghormley was also troubled by the fact that information being sent over byKirk was being locked in safes at ONI, rather than being sent to the technicalbureaus where they were needed. Using language reminiscent of that used byKirk in the spring, he concluded that “this war laboratory...is bringing forth newlessons every day” and feared the Navy was losing a golden opportunity toimprove its readiness for war if the information was not properly disseminated. 269The sixth meeting of the Joint Bailey Committee, held on 23 September 1940,specifically concerned intelligence liaison. A number of decisions were madeduring the course of this meeting. The major achievement was the agreement toestablish liaison missions in the intelligence centers of each country once itlooked like America was close to entering the war. To support the exchange ofinformation between intelligence facilities, the British informed the U.S. they haddeveloped a special code table for secure communication among intelligence centersand they decided to pre-stage these codes so that they could be rapidly issuedto the Americans once the liaison missions were established. 270 Recommendationswere also made to continue sharing information on HF/DF stations, with theeventual goal being the evolution of a common organization for exploitation ofthis source. 271 Although it would be a long time before any of these recommenda-268 Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, USN, Chief ofNaval Operations, 20 September 1940, Strategic Planning. Cited hereafter as Ghormley, “Memo toStark,” 20 September 1940. ONI was not the only organization to frustrate RADM Pott, who foundthe lack of a central intelligence organization, like the British JIC, a major stumbling block in theexchange of information with the Americans. ONI eventually issued guidance, almost 2 monthsafter Ghormley’s missive to Stark cited above, to all the Navy’s bureaus, instructing them to giveAdmiral Pott full cooperation on a number of technical matters, to include low-level SIGINT. Foradditional information see Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 180; Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN,Director of Naval <strong>Intelligence</strong>, Letter to All Naval Bureau Chiefs and Directors of Divisions, 12November 1940, DNI Correspondence; Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to AdmiralHarold Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, 14 November 1940, Strategic Planning.269 Ghormley, “Memo to Stark,” 20 September 1940, Strategic Planning.270 “B. C. (JG) Sixth Meeting, United States Naval Co-operation, Minutes of Meeting held onMonday, 23rd September, 1940,” 23 September 1940, Subject: British and U.S. <strong>Intelligence</strong> Liaison,Strategic Planning, 1-3. Cited hereafter as “Bailey Committee 6th Meeting Minutes,” StrategicPlanning.76
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
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officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
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ships in violation of treaty limits
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assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
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might bear on their work.” 39 As
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ility over time, its operational in
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Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
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told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
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ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
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firmly believed that British polici
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ecame one of the primary sources of
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- Page 119 and 120: ________. Foreign Relations of the
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- Page 126 and 127: INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
- Page 128 and 129: IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 8
- Page 130 and 131: Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
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