COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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IImagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 81Ingersoll Mission 30-34, 79, 95Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Royall 26, 31-34, 41Isolationism 23, 28, 30, 33, 38-39, 40, 58-59, 85JJapanese threat 4, 6-7, 18-19, 21, 25, 27, 28-31, 35, 41, 79, 86, 95Joint Bailey Committee 74-78Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) 11-12, 88, 98Joint Planning Staff 11Joint Staff Mission 80, 88KKennedy, Joseph P. 60-61King, Fleet Admiral Ernest 19Kirk, Vice Admiral AlanGoodrich 5, 9, 43-45, 47-56, 60, 62, 66, 70-71, 75-76, 78, 88-89, 97Knone, Colonel Hayes 89Knox, Frank 19, 37, 39-41, 58, 60, 62, 66-68, 82, 93LLeahy, Admiral William D. 6, 8, 31, 35-36, 38, 40Lee, Colonel Raymond 71, 89Lend-Lease 78, 81, 85Lessons for the U.S. Intelligence Community 93-98Lindsay, Sir Ronald 31Lockwood, Captain Charles P. 81London Naval Conference, 1930 18, 25, 28London Naval Conference, 1935 25, 27-30, 95M“MAGIC” 9, 82Mahan, Alfred Thayer 17McCollum, Commander Arthur 91Menzies, Sir Stewart 11, 82, 90Mesopotamia 21-22Military Intelligence Division (U.S.) 2, 59117
NNational Defense Research Council (NDRC) 66, 68Naval Arms Limitation 18, 25-26, 30Naval Intelligence Division (NID) 8, 12Naval Research Laboratory 65Naval War College 19Niblack, Captain Albert P. 15Norden bombsight 34, 66OOffice of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 2-10, 13, 59-60, 76, 88, 92Office of Strategic Services 4, 62Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) 8, 12, 32, 52-53, 81, 90-92ORANGE (Japan) 19PPaget, Sir James 58Panay Incident 31, 35“Plan Dog” memorandum 40, 70, 77-78Political Warfare Executive 10, 62-63Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley 64, 68, 74, 92Propaganda 53, 58-59“Purple” 3, 82-83QQuackenbush, Lieutenant Robert S. 81Quid pro quo, as policy 27, 34, 45-47, 50-52, 57-58, 63-68, 95-96RRAINBOW FIVE 41Roosevelt, FranklinDelano 3, 28, 31, 37-39, 41, 50, 55, 58, 60-62, 69-70, 73, 79, 82, 85, 90, 93SSan Remo Agreement, 1920 21Secret Intelligence Service (SIS - MI6) 10-11, 13, 58-60, 62, 87-88Security 4, 59Security Service (MI5) 10, 58118
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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLYAn Evaluat
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The Joint Military Intelligence Col
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FOREWORDTo most Americans alive tod
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PROLOGUESince World War II, the Uni
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Chapter 1THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE
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action, a propaganda unit, or an ec
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officers assisted by 20 civilian cl
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ships in violation of treaty limits
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assessments. By 1941, ONI was releg
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might bear on their work.” 39 As
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ility over time, its operational in
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Chapter 2U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-19
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told by the Chief of Naval Operatio
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ups of the early 20th century. 65 T
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firmly believed that British polici
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ecame one of the primary sources of
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of shoring up their strategic weakn
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mon framework for negotiation with
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assuaged British concerns about the
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In the area of intelligence exchang
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clear to the Americans that if they
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in his mind worked against closer c
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praised the fighting spirit of the
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through November of 1940 persuaded
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and Great Britain. His principalcon
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eceived by the British and from the
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gear designed by the British. Altho
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American Attitudes On Intelligence
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information did have an impact on K
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the affair. 183 This lack of resent
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tion exchanges. Even more significa
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nation (BSC) mission, is now availa
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good will and encouraged greater co
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would merely show Donovan “the be
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Lothian passed Hill’s proposal to
Page 77 and 78: still a powerful influence. While Z
Page 79 and 80: Since the Tizard Mission had only a
Page 81 and 82: appropriating large increases to th
Page 83 and 84: the French, a point which would not
Page 85 and 86: equested that RADM Ghormley remain
Page 87 and 88: when he [Pott] comes to O.N.I. he i
Page 89 and 90: it was not official U.S. policy. St
Page 91 and 92: efforts that had begun with the Sta
Page 93 and 94: high-level ABC-1 staff talks which
Page 95 and 96: to successfully interpret the instr
Page 97 and 98: to little more than a nebulous stat
Page 99 and 100: to offer.” 319 Others in the Brit
Page 101 and 102: Operational Intelligence Cooperatio
Page 103 and 104: Godfrey’s main concern was most l
Page 105 and 106: possesses complementary capabilitie
Page 107 and 108: 2. Be prepared to give something of
Page 109 and 110: had in forming its own Joint Intell
Page 112 and 113: GLOSSARYABC-1ALUSNALondonBGENBSCCAP
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX AA NOTE ON SOURCESArchival
Page 116: APPENDIX BMAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK I
Page 119 and 120: ________. Foreign Relations of the
Page 121 and 122: ________. “The Secret of the Chur
Page 123 and 124: Zacharias, Ellis M., CAPT, USN. Sec
Page 126 and 127: INDEXAABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78
Page 130 and 131: Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) 2-3, 7
Page 132: PCN 53512ISBN 0-9656195-9-1
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