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COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

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Chapter 8EVALUATION:SUCCESS OF THE BRITISH EFFORTThe British aggressively used a number of highly effective tactics to secure acloser intelligence relationship with the U.S. prior to the U.S.’s actually enteringthe war. These approaches took place on many levels and through many venues aspart of a comprehensive, although not necessarily well coordinated, plan on thepart of the British to draw the U.S. into World War II as their ally. Although theU.S. may have been predisposed to aid the British, given their common interests,it is unlikely the U.S. would have drawn as close to the British as they did in theperiod from 1938 to 1941 were it not for persistent British overtures.As the U.S. progressed toward supporting Britain in the war, intelligenceexchanges between the two countries became commonplace. Althoughincreased cooperation was consistently hampered by tensions and animosities,by the time the U.S. entered the war, cooperation in the area of intelligence,particularly naval intelligence, was well beyond anything anyone would haveimagined possible in 1939. Although U.S. decisionmakers in the Navy hierarchy—Roosevelt,Knox, and Stark—were predisposed to aid the British,because they clearly saw it was in the U.S. national interest to do so, they werealso very cautious. Even though they were receptive to British overtures, theinitiation of cooperative ventures was difficult given domestic political constraintsand the U.S. desire, especially among military officials, to be treated asequals by the British. Given this reluctance on the part of the American policymakersand senior military officials, it is highly unlikely that the level of intelligencecooperation attained between the two navies in the interwar period wouldhave been as extensive and wide-ranging as it became, were it not for repeatedBritish initiatives designed to advance that purpose. By gambling well with themost significant bargaining chips available to them—their technical advances,intelligence resources, and war experience—the British secured a “special relationship”with the United States in matters of intelligence, a relationship thatstill brings substantial benefits to both sides.Lessons for The U.S. <strong>Intelligence</strong> CommunityIf the rationale for intelligence sharing can be reduced to a cost-benefit calculationwhereby countries seek to mitigate weaknesses in their intelligence capabilityby seeking to arrange a limited partnership with a state or group that93

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