COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

forward, some by ONI, no real improvement in this situation occurred until thefounding of the Coordinator of Information office, the predecessor to the Officeof Strategic Services (OSS), in the summer of 1941. 11 As noted later in this study,the founding of this office did correct some of the deficiencies in the U.S. intelligencesystem, but overcoming bureaucratic barriers was a difficulty throughoutthe war period and is an issue the Intelligence Community has continued to wrestlewith to the present day.ONI: Organization and Limitations of America’s FirstIntelligence ServiceThe organization which would one day become ONI was first formed in1882 as the Navy realized its need for information in peacetime that wouldassist in the war-planning and procurement that was required to fight in anyfuture conflict. 12 ONI’s responsibilities evolved over time, but by 1938 its principalresponsibilities included collection and analysis on foreign countries, particularlyon their naval establishments; administration of the naval attachéprogram; Navy public relations; “operation of the Navy’s public records andlibrary; preparation and dissemination of data on our own and foreign navies”;counterespionage; and security. 13 To meet these requirements, ONI was organizedinto branches to deal with Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Intelligence,Historical Records, and Public Relations. 14 These branches were further subdividedinto country desks and offices meant to address specific technicalissues, such as gunnery. In terms of regional assessments, ONI focused on Russia,because of the fear of communism and its influence on the workers inindustries critical to the Navy, and on Japan, which was seen as the main threatand was the focus of U.S. naval war planning. 15As noted earlier, resource constraints were a significant factor limiting theeffectiveness of ONI. At the end of World War I, there were 306 officers workingin ONI’s Washington, DC offices, but by 1935 that number had dwindled to 2111Wyman H. Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), 16, 225;Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 119-120.12Alan Harris Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 4.13 Packard, 323.14 Parkard, 321-323.15 Columbia University, The Reminiscences of Royal E. Ingersoll (New York: Oral HistoryResearch Office, 1965), 46, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. Citedhereafter as Ingersoll Reminiscences.4