COURTING A RELUCTANT ALLY - National Intelligence University

war that were emanating from the U.S. Embassy in London. Donovan, because ofhis connections and his pro-British stance, became Stephenson’s instrument fordoing this. 210 Although both Secretary of War Stimson and Knox did not think theEmbassy was providing an accurate assessment of England’s chances, they couldmake no official overtures to the British because of the domestic political climate.During a meeting attended by Knox, Stimson, Donovan, and Stephenson, atwhich the destroyer-for-bases deal being discussed, Stephenson saw that the maindilemma facing the decisionmakers in the U.S. government was whether Englandwould survive the summer. They required proof “that American material assistancewould be, not improvident charity, but a sound investment.” 211 To overcomethe dilemma, Stephenson suggested sending Donovan on an independent factfindingmission to Great Britain. Not only was Donovan respected by the President,but as former political opponent of Roosevelt, a Republican, a Catholic, anda Southerner, he was not part of Roosevelt’s constituency and his conclusionswould be seen as completely independent. 212 Knox presented the idea to the President,who approved the mission. Although he officially traveled as “a personalrepresentative of the Secretary of the Navy,” the key decisionmakers on bothsides of the Atlantic knew he was traveling at the behest of the President and werewell aware of how critical his assessment would be for the relationship betweenthe two countries. 213On the day of Donovan’s departure, Stephenson cabled the Central SecurityService (CSS) headquarters to inform them that Donovan was arriving by steamerand that his evaluation of British prospects would be the key to unlocking thedestroyer-for-bases deal and fostering closer cooperation with the Americans. 214The British at this stage knew far more about the trip than Ambassador Kennedy,who was not informed that Donovan was coming or what the purpose of his tripwould be. 215 CAPT Kirk and his staff, however, were aware, given Donovan’sofficial status, and they made many of his arrangements. 216 Kirk and Donovanalso had a personal relationship and, while Kirk was concerned that the British210Ford, 90; BSC, Secret History, 9.211BSC, Secret History, 9.212 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 97-103; Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 176; BSC, SecretHistory, 9; MacLachlan, 225-226.213 N. R. Hitchcock, CDR, USN, Assistant Naval Attaché for Air, Memorandum to Air CommodoreBoyle, Air Ministry, n.d., Kirk Papers. Given its place in the collection and the topic, thismemo was probably written between 22-24 July 1940.214 BSC, Secret History, 9-10.215James Leutze, The London Journal of General Raymond E. Lee, 1940-1941 (Boston, MA:Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), 19. Cited hereafter as Leutze, London Journal.61